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I. INTRODUCTION 
Isolated exchange may be defined as a situation ln •ic:h tw or llOh 
perSONS. which have each a certain atlk>Uftt of coaaodltles, try to eia:bange 
these cotmioditles vtth each other. ift order to inct'eaa• th utllity for 
each person belonging to the atlk)Uftt of coaaaodttlea held by tl\fst perlOI\. 
If Ol\ly t'W persons an involved, Isolated exchange ta sometimes called 
bilateral n>nopoly. 
One of the interesting and at the s.ame tlme disturb\~s a•peot• of 
uotated exchange ts, that persons need to reach agreement vlth each 
other about the particular amount of co1nof:Utlt• to be exchanged. Rach 
person lihlcb ts a party lrt the isolated ~. will coMtder ln 
general several factors, ,.-bieh w:tll detnmtne for hi• which $0lution ls 
reaSOIUlbl• and 1fb1eh not. 
In thta thesis w wUl not cons1dft' all the factor• having tnfluertce 
on the solution of the isolated exchange altuatlon. lrl8tead we 'Will 
concentrate only on the possible effect of one parti~ular f•ctor, MMly 
the effect of the utUittes belonging to the coanodlUes of each person 
on the soluUon, lf these utUi tlea can be coapartd by all pe1'80tla. ta 
abort. ve are lntensted in the affect o'&\ the toluUoa lf lnterpert0ual 
cottparlaon of utility ta poaa1ble. 
There are many solutions propoMd for tbe caH of leolated 
exch•s• and the attuatton would become rathel' complicated if th• effect 
of interpersonal comparlaon of uttllty would be conalde~ for all theH 
aoluttone. As a 111aln source for the dUferencea ln .eolutloo.a howver, 
2 
may be con•tdered the differences la bat'gatntq akUla of the persona. 
lf we •xclude the effact• of dtffer.m.ce• tn bargalntna akUls thuefore, 
th• auriabel' of po.aat\Jle solutions •1 be peatly reduced tmd consequently 
the t_,,estlgatton may become 111.tC!b. slmpl.er, 
One particular aaptct of bargatntl\8 aid lla 11 the a.bt Uty of a pei'• 
soa of nat1lnfoti11na othe'r pertoM about oneta owt uUUtlea. Mlapenep· 
Uon• about vtUltl•• •7 tafluec• the tol•tlon. w. wlll excluclt the• 
effttot• bf aa..tq complete lafonatlott of all perecm.. 
We wtU find tt toavll\lent to coa:aid•:r the proce•• tn wbtch the 
p•rMttt tl'J to r._h agre--.t, •• a e,eetal tJP• of rtpated play of a 
1-.. 06 the one hand the a- wt 11 np..-.1411\t all th• ••pec:ta of the 
l•l•~d ao"-1• •tt••Son and on the other hand u wtU be t"elettvely 
ea•y to c:cmduc;t th,.... •• an up11tl~t to t••t che propoae4 tol\ltlM. 
All a atartl"I potnt w Will eoftllcltr ta Ct.pt•~ Il t.'be ~lttlve 
aotutlotl a..S ttt. laa 1CJlt1Uon $ •k• • COMpadl01\ Mt•• "*'• ln 
Chaptei- nt w vlll •t•t• flt•t expUcltl1 the coiutn.toaa, under· llhlch • 
v111 I nve11t gate tht t aolated ••baa• •t tutsoa.. I•••• upon th•• 
coadtttou •will th.ea cnuo.t• tltt .,...tattw •luttoo and tbtt Nash 
toluUOft aacl pnpoM and erttlotM a, apect•l bypotbe·•l• for a aoluU011. 
Ia Chapt.er lV ve cot11lder :ln paJ'tlcwt.r t'- t• peraon tsolated 
txc'han&• •t·tuetlcm _. 1 .. raUn the h)'POlh••l•. Finally tn Chapter v 
• cou14•r the three perlOft: isolated • ....._, 1Uuat.1oe and the cott-
plteatlont •sc •• tntnd.uced 'by the lMr•ae l• 1\Ulllffr of p•nou 
frot1 t• to tbne. 
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11. TH! COMP!TITlV! SOLUTlON AMI> THE NASH SOLUTION 
As llck• (2, p. 1) pol1lted out tn the ln.tro4uetton. of •value and 
Capital", the matbeMttcal •thod t11ltu lt po••lble to deal wt.th 
different .conomc. aubject• ln OM book, by the mtty ln method. Be 
•bowed this subsequently l>y ifttqrattag the theory of exchange •nd the 
ttwtory of production. 
SlftCe t:ha p\lbltc.Uon of Ms contrU1uUOI\ tn 1939, tt baa atadually 
blcot11 cu•t011ary to uae th a.-. &pproach even if the subj.et• are dealt 
wltb ••P•rately. 'the •legancy of the method •Y be d..utratttd pemapa 
1'y the fact that we can d••crlbe the mltt-•rltet equtllbrlt.a cottdlttou 
in a ataUe pure uchana• ec0ta0111 of n lndtvtd.ual• and 11 c~ttle• by 
the fol1o"1"8 aet Gf equatlont (1, p. 133) t 
u • 1, ••• ,n.) 
(j • 1, ••• ··> 
(j - 1 ••••• 1111) 
l 
2 
The • ..-uou 1 are • l1'dlvtdua1 •••u cl...-d funcuou. .tllch an 
bollogeneov1 of dQr'M zero h\ pt"lcu. The • ooadt.tlon• 2 atate that 
.wry urket -.t b4t cleal'e • ~ a,.t .. , cont.al•••+• equattona vtth 
th• '*' tndlvtdual •111Ct•• d..-.nd• .act ~ (• • 1) ~ana• ~atlo• •• 
v•rtabl••· Tht• t11p1ie• that one of t"- •qqUou 1• f\a\Ctlonally d•p•-
ct.t Ul>Oft the otbera, IO tb•t the •Pt• en only btl elftd for relatl,,. 
' 
prlc••· The quaatltl•• a'ftCI price• 1atl•fJlng the tquattona 1 and 2 1.t 
call for future reference lhe competitive aoluUon. 
4 
The tNltvtdual exce•• d .. ftd functlou 1 can be detlftd from the 
flr•t order condltlon• which nu1t be .. tt1fled by the c0ft9Ullltl''• 
~atraltted. uttllty tadex: 
"' 
'1 • ul(!u + q~tt··••1tm + ~ .. > ·A<L pjElJ>. 
t•l 
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provided that the second order oondttlol\I are alao aatlafted (1, p. 130). 
nie ujor drawback of tht• •th ... ucat aet up ta, that tt l• a 
atatlc equUtbrh• theory. It can only COl'lalder altuatlona ••n the 
equUlbl'lum C01'ldttton1, expreaMd b1 t'b.e ftr1t and aecond order c:olldUlona 
on 3. are fulfllled or almoat fulfllled for lnflnttulmal -u departurea 
froi"ll the equlltbrtua aoluttOft. 
B. AdJuatmeut Kechaftt • · 
A• the equUtbrlum ltMlf la • apectal 1ltuatlon, wblch •1 be 
reached at the end of an eshanae pn>ceaa, rather than be the atarttna 
polnt of it, 1181\Y wrltera have tried to glve more att-.tlon to the proceu 
by 1rftlch the equtUbrlwa way be nae:'*!. In fact thS1 had bee ~· tradt• 
ttonal approach before the equlltbri\ml t~ry by HJcka and othel'• waa 
deVeloped. M a example of tbla approach we vtll conalder ttTbe Theory 
of E111Change", by Peter lle,..n (6). 
tn Chapter IV, Ne- deaerlbe• the attal ...... t of equtllbtt• la 
bilateral ncbange by canslderlng an adjuattmlt -.ohanl• -.cl lta OQl\VU:• 
geQCe. W• will SU1111arlze bl• argulllftta. 
In Ftaure 1 w have 1ho• in an Ed&north box dtaar• •l•Uar to 
tho .. used by~. the naceaaary aapect• to denrlbe th• worldag of tM 
adjuttment. •chant•• At the begtmtq of the excbanse th.e po•l ttou of 
s 
2 
E 
f 
e 
d 
0 a b c 
Figure l. Edgeworth box diagram for persons I and It and 
commodities 1 and 2 
D l 
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the two penou l and II la at the polnt o. Person I haa only the amount 
01> of c:omodtty 1 and pel'llOft 11 ha• OE of co1111ocllty 2. '11\e polnt O tlbould 
not be lnterpntecJ •• origin. Strictly apealdng an. Ed&north boa cltagram 
baa alwya tw ortgtu. one wt.th napeet to every penon. In Ftaure l, 
the point D la the ortgln with reapect to ~ a110unta of cOlllll>dttles of 
. person I aftd E la the orlaln wlth napect to the amotet• of c~ttlu 
of per80ft 1I. 
The .. t of .COllblnatlona of comaodltlea 1and2for11\tch the utllltl•• 
to perlOtt I ate the 11a111 a• the uttllty of tht 4fl0\l!lt OD of coanodlty 1, 
l• called the lnttlal lndtf fennce cun. of person. t. It ta a curve 
through O conwx to the point D and show.•• t 1 ta Figure 1. Llkewl .. the 
tadtfference cuna belonging to the vtlltty of the tnltlal amunt OE of 
comodl ty 2 for tI, l• ebom aa the curve 111 tl\rough o convex to E la 
the ftaur-. '11\e contract curve la the Ht of poluta tnalde of the lndlf· 
f enaoe CUl"'flea "1\lch la meh, that for any polat outalde the ••t but 
11hlch la wtthln the cloud nglon bounded by the lndlffuence curwa 
belon&lftl to the latttal 1tate1 of perSONt t atrd 11. then la at 1eaat 
ou point la the Ht U\teh ta preferred by both 1 and tt. FurtheftllDft no 
potttt on the c:ontract CUl'W 1• pnfund by both over any other polnt Ol'l 
the conti-act eune. The contract curw l• alao called the set of Pareto 
optt•l polnta. lt ta abowt •• the curve >:4. tt mey b9 found •• tba •t 
of polnta of tangency of the lndlffennce curvu of per80ft8 I and It 
witbln the l'ellon bounded by the hdtlal lndlfference CUIWS. 
Wt have alao 11\o-..n the tradlag curve of each penon. The tl."adlr\I 
curve of per*'l\ t l• Indicated by t 2 and the trading C\ll'ft of II by n 2• 
1 
A t~acllq G\tl'Ve of ·• ,peraon 1• the ••t of solution poln.t• to the bilateral 
.-haftl* a1tuatlcm • .at whlcb that ptr80n 111dmi1t11 hle utUUy, Slvtm all 
"°*•lble •~• ·taUo• tU4h tb4t \\0 neaatlve eotr.lea en.tu tn the 
e:MC'bqe r*tl.o• or- prl••· ?bit la•t comllUOtl IDltat\S lb.It tbe angle of the 
pdceUne wlth ''* po•ti~• •·•xi• ••t. not bt -ll•r than o0 and not 
0 puter t1*1 90 • 
ln o!'cla ~o find the ttadlftl \'Nl'ft• w need the tndlff•reftCAt CUJVe& 
be.loflllq to aU poutbla pobitt, at luat vlthla the n&loa cmclond by 
·the tdtff•renee CNrte• beloqtng to the tnltlal amo\11\tl of comodU:les 
of pel"sont I and It. At th• pdee r1 for tut.Ince. via f1114 the point Ol\ 
tbl tndtng 0'4'ft of pU'SOI\ I• by maidmh~l.q pe1'ton 1 •a utl 1t ty given 
that prt~ alld ~•lna that the pof.n~ at •teh he •nml•• hi• uttUty 
ts a tolutton po.tftt ot tbie exchange situation. Ftom th• •~ulUbrt• 
theory dealt with before, • know th.at the polat Oft the tradlna ourve 
wtll 'be the point of ~cy of ~· pl"leeUne vltb an btdtffere\M cvrve 
of per•oa 1. Thia polat ll lftdleattd b1 the polat with coordlutu b M4 
f ln the figure. In the .,.. way w fllld the polt\t on th• 't!"ac:Uq curve 
cf tl for the N• prh~• r1 .• u th• point lt\dleated by th• coordt•t.• • 
atki cl •. 
We ua 1t0V 4-acri'be th• wt1dag, of the adjuataeat •chatdam. It 
COttJJl•tS of • CO\\tl.'01 ... 1tlam1 the pdM aN • dtclalon rule 1llhicb 
detentlM• tke direction of adJqtamt of the pdce, gtven the bld• of 
pa•cm. I .ad 11 !n the •t'ket. The adjuatueat proc••• \1.rrk• •• follow. 
SUp10•• the prioe ln t• lla'ket at a certaln .,..t i• P 1• Then both 
ptl'IOU t 81\d ll vlll take thl• prlc:e .itl &1ven and offer am •111tna1t for 
ftllh-ae ISUCh that they wUl both .W.tllse tt.11' utllttr. !hat I•• they 
wU 1 ofter at11c>uat• fo:t •xduin&• dttftldned by th• lateraeetioa. of thtl 
prlce.llu Ind thetr ttac1tial cwvu. 
SO at P1• penon I wt U offer b of co••tliy l ta ~ for f of 
cOlllOdlt7 2. Pe~son U will oft•r d. of ~otl*Odlt7 2 tn exehdp for a o.f 
cOdllOdttJ 1. Apparently at tl\41 pdce P1 tbt .-oua~• of ueh ~tty 
offe"4 -4 deat\C!ed clo Mt •tcb. Thh'• hi m ua:;eu offw of cOMOdlty 
1 aad an • ._.,~ for c~dity 2 and e~e 1d.11 n.oi tak• plao•• 
The ddl•ton. rule nov detemtnea that: the ~nee "1U bl adJuatcd tn • 
dlre<:tlon favorable to the cOlllC>dl ty lfl·th ece•• demand.. tn our ea• 
tb.lt f • cc~lty 2. In tenw of ttaut• 1 tlda tmpll•• ttlat tM aqle of 
the ,n•eU• with ti. po•lttve •·ci• vUl kcomt -.11tl!'. say the .. 
price la 12• 
At the ncnr· prlc•, pe.r~ I at\d 11 wtll llak• •sata .a of:f•r d.•t•l"• 
ld•ed by the lat•aecttoa of prlc• Pd trM!tag C\tn"ea. lf the bt4a •tl U 
do not •tch, the price wilt be adJuated aaat• tn a dit:•tloa favorple 
to the CQMOdlty ln uceM dCtllnd.. 'thlt Ptoo••• .s ll be r~ated until 
tb..-e l• no •••sa .Sealll\cl f..or one COllUOdU.y od COflttq\Jeiltly •lto Mt for 
th• other C:Oflltl)dlty. tt Se o.t.ar that the P~••• wUl flal.$h it t1-
pobit where the tradtq •rn• inte~t. /la at thl• bltenecttoa • 
other point l• ,nfared by both parU••• tbt• lstt•r•tctl01l -...t. be °" 
the contract CM:Ve. It l• lltdlcated b7 ·tile pelat c ta ~ figure. 
At the interuttlon also the coadtU.0t1t l •cl l of P• 3• are 
pnclaely ntisf'ted for the: ca• n • 2. • • i. ~ !Ibo• nbMqlilet.\tly 
\11\der tth•t condi tlONJ we my •e""C.t that IO wtlont may •xi at and art 
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unique. The .aolutlon vUl always mat lf the area -.closed by the 
lndlfference curvw• conalta of more than one poln.t, but It need not be 
untque. The case of non•unlqv.cneaa la hcwwr quite special and depend• 
on rather special ahapea of the lndlffeNllC• ourve1. ta general thertfore 
w may aaame the IOluUon to be unique. 
A4 the solution aaUaflea condltlona l 81\d 2 of P•&• 3, wa vlll call 
lt alao the ~Uttve aolutton. A4 the competltlve solution lndlcated 
by point c Uea on the contract curve. w haw the property th.It a compe-
tl U w aolutlon l• Pueto optlt11el. On the other band 'l\Ot any point on 
the contract curve ta the competl tlw aoluUon. Thenfore the fact that 
a point la Panto optl•l does not imply that 1t la th9 competitive 
aolutlon. 
c. An Alternative Derivation of the Competitive Solution 
The devtce of the Edgeworth box dl•P'• has .,. advaat.qea •tch 
makes 1t particularly uaeful tn bilateral e-=hana• 1ltuatlona. A dhacl• 
vantage howver t •, that the device caa not be e¢an.ded to deal v:l th threa 
person aituatlona. In thla aectlon w will derive the competltlve 
solutlon of the two peraoa t• COlmiDdlty •xduma• attuatlon by a •tbod 
Wilch la equival•t to the approach uHCI tn aeotloa B, but lend• itself 
more eaatly for ca ... of 110re than tw persona. 
Let ua therefore coaalder •&ain Fl&Uh l, !ut now we vat to 
consider the point 0 ex.pltcltly as the odgtn of the apace of COllll!Odltlea 
1 and 2. Along the x .. axta we measUl't the amount of co•ocHty 1 and along 
the 1·•xl• the &llll)unt of comziocUty 2. Furthermore we indicate by I the 
10 
vector of .amc>Ul.\t.a of Oota>dl ties l and. 21 pertlOU t baa t.tdt.laUy" In the 
same •1 11 lndleatu the 8'IOUftt• of ccmmodt ties l i8M 2 person u ha.s 
tah1ally. \le vUl UH lntachqeahl7 the tent vector I, or point 1 1 or 
tt0•l tton of t • 
SUppoH perlOt\a 'I ~ 1t have lnltialty the ... a11Dunt1 as they Md 
ll\ FllUl"• 1. Flgut"t 2 th.en ahowa the poeltton.s of peTton• I and 11 ln 
the comll!O.dtty apace. The vector (c,o) fo~ tnsunee bas •• fir•t coordl· 
Mte the --~t e of eonaodtty 11 'tihlch ta .equal. to the amo\ll\t on In 
naurt 1. 'the total amo•t of CO*l>dJtie• of pet$0n• I ad tt together 
w l~lcate by the vectol" T (t ,II). P•raoaa t .acl tI aay chat\a• thell' 
po1lt1otU by eKhan.sl!\I cth each other. ~t«Vft exchange vt.11 take 
pb.c• • the total .-ount of ~1 tl•• tlldlcat:ed b)' the ,. of the MW 
poattlcnl.a of t and U vl11 •1•YI add u,· to t(t,tt)• 
W. nov eon•truct ti. ll'ldlffer"'" ~ beloqtq to the htlttal 
po#ltlOJl of penon l, ttartl1'8 f~• t. laatud of f~• O ad. eon.veg t• the 
orlglft o. 1!he poaltlon of the lndtffa'ff\'lee curve of peraon t. wtth respect 
to tM Uu ae..-t fl'Oll l to T(I.tt) lft Ptgure, 2. l• •qulvaleat to t:M 
poattton of the lndlff4tl'..-d cvrve of person t with reapct to t:btt UM 
,..._t OI hi Flgun l. Itt tbe •- •1 • couuvct r.M lndtffel'-.Ce 
eurv• of It 1 whioh la a.bo convex witb f'••pect to the: od&la o. the 
ttdtlal tadifferenc• c:urve• of Pft'*»'• l ad It an lfldtcated re•pfftlwly 
bJ t 1 and n 1• 
Po't ••h pu:IOft t\tere exlata • lafinlt• numbtr of lnctltfu.nc:e 
.:U'l'ff•• beloqll\g to .•11 poaslble poilt.lon• in the comodlty apac•• If 
- •alud• ..-uve --•t• of comM:>dltf.·•·· an 90••1ble poaltlou of 
p 
c 
2 
0 
ll 
a b 
Figure 2. Exchange diagram for persons I and II and 
commodities 1 and 2 
c l 
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peraona t and It 11Ult be within the box OlT(I,It)It. At any poaltton of 
a person ft exchange ratio or pt'lce 1• lndlcatecl by a atr•laht ll• 
th1'0ugh the poaltlon of the p•rton. In general therefor• an nchanp ra• 
tlo l• tndlcated by tw parallel •tratght ltnea, .. ch t'hrouah the po1ttion 
of one perton. In the flgun w have lnc:llcated llft •J&Chan&e ratlo by the 
ltne P1• 
The trading curwa of peT.eona t and II w uy flnd, by the ,... 
method aa tn aectton B, •• the nt1 of polnta of tangenoy of •1 price 
Una vtth the Indifference curves of the peraon. We have Ibo• poa1lbl• 
trading cunea of perlOftS I and II by 12 and n 2• Accol'dln& to the ..,. 
procedure aa ln section B, peraon I wtll at the prt.ce P1 offa: an ..,unt 
for exchange such that he raachea hla tradtna curw. At the prt- r 1 for 
instance permon I will offer an a'llO\lftt Cc • b) of comoc.tlt7 1 ln •xchaaae 
for an as.>unt e of coanodtty 2. On the other hod 11 VSU otfer at the 
1a11e prtee Cf • d) of cotmnodlty 2 for a of co11810dtty 1. 
The new poaltlona of persona I and U we haw lt\dtcated by t and 
Pt 
11 • B\lt at theh aew poat tlona the am of the vector• I eel II doe• 
P1 Pt Pt 
not add Up to T (Itll) • 11\ta co•tn.aUot\ of po•lttcm.a therefore lt lapo1• 
1ll>l•• exchange doea not take place because the •rkat 11 ftOt cleared. 
We may nov uae the .... devtce of the adjU8t.O.t .chat• to flad 
the competitive aoluttoa. ~ prlce wlll be adju1te4 ta a dlreetlot\ 
favorable to the cornodl ty ln ••••• d ..... Ul\tl 1 the .- of the new 
polltlon• of persona I and II add• up to T(I,u).• Thia 1• al• nactly 
at the point ••re the .- of the dlaplacnent• of l aad It add• up to 
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ft'l'O. Ia tu ftaure w have •how the aolutton at the price P0 fo-r peraoa 
t •• c1 and for 11 a• c1t. 1be •• of the ~tor• (c1 ... I) .and <c11 • II) 
ta Nl"C. Furthemore it can. be 8bo• that the .-tMtl axchaqed at the 
COtlllp4ltltlve eolutton are identle.tl wt.th th• l'llOmtts exch4nged at the 
comp•tlttve aolutlon ht Flgvrt t. 
So htat.ead of belng one point, the eospettttvt molutton .,, coulata 
of • polnt for ach per10ft. The ... wl U be tt• ln general of the 
Pareto. opttal cune. to Me thl• let u• look at Figure 3, tlilhlch ta the 
•- •• figure 2 •• f•r •• th• po al dona of penou t and U and the 
huU ff ueaee curves ar• concemed. 
svppoae per10n tl 1*>vea to the point D on hi1 01t11 11\dlf fenm.ce cune. 
1'het, in order for excbal\ae to be p0•aible, pel"*>tl t baa to move to &. 
The veetor• t> and D add up exactly to T(l ,Il) , U • let mve person IX 
along hla tn1Ual SndUference curve we c;an. tr.Ce out the ®rve •long 
\lhlch l hat to snove in orde't for exoban.ge to \Je J>O••lble. Tb.la curve of 
peraot\ I ve hav• lndteated by 13• Peraon l ean •ver ge't more to tl\e 
dpt for ay po•1lt>le poslttol\ of tI on hl1 initial 1ndlff•ftllCta curve, 
a1, ta.cUcated by 1,, because an)' poaltlon to th• dght of the o\\rve 13 
t-.plle• a potlUOl'l of lt to the left. of hla tnttla1 lndtffercm.te C\S'l'Ve 
t.e., a poattion '10rM the the original poattlon of "rton n. lt ls 
not reaeoual>le to e.xpee.~ that peraoft II wt 11 ear•• UpOn audt an 
••bani•· W. IMIY eall. the eurve t 3 therefore, the •urve of tuxl-.. pol• 
alble uttUty gatu of person t for any po•ltlon of II along hls tnlttal 
tndlfferen~ curv.. 
Likevt.se w may construct the curve u 3 of maximum possible utility 
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Figure 3. The curves of maximum possible utility gains and the 
contract curves for persons I and II 
gain.a of It for pel'SO!\ I movtq alot'lg hla tnltlal Indifference tnttVe. 
But the lnlt:lal it\dtffenm¢e curve ls aot the only lndlffennce C1JJ'Ve a 
peJ'aon may move along. Suppose for f.atan.ce we let person lI move along 
• • his ln.cUffei-enee cune tt1: Then peraon. I has to eve •tona t 3 in order 
for exchange to 'be possible. .. 
Suppoae n.ow we let person II mve along the indifference 'QUrvt n 1 • 
tillch la tanget1t to hl• curve of maxt_. po1atbl• uttUty 14tu u 3 at E. 
" num person I ftlllSt move along a curve 13 which la taqeat to ht• lnUial .. 
lndtffenmce curve. say at A. aeeauH a• ti. ~urve n 1 hat O'C\ly one. 
polnt in comon vtth the curve It3• th.ere can only be ol'le polttt fot 
peraon I on the curve 11 by the property that for· any vecto1' in the 
commodity apace then 1• e:Kactly one other vector euch that. tbelr aum 
•dda up to T(I;lt)• 
At E the utUity aatn of tl la at the •xlmum V\lle at A the utUtty 
aatn of person I la zero. The pole.ts A au E are a Pareto opt1•1 eomb1· 
l\aUon of points for persona I ac:l 11. Tha.t. ta, 1t oan be ab.oWl that no 
9*>V8181ll\t awy fnnn the points A and ! la poaatble wlt.h th• cOl\Mn.t of 
both player•. If person It for in1t.ance move• along b.11 tn.dUference ,. .. 
curve tt1 at E, person t has to move elong t 3 • Thl• tmp1te1 that if 
person tI remains at tbe sa• utUlty level or 1Mrease• ble uttHty 
level, peraon I wU1 decreate his uttUty level lll order foY excbal\ge to 
be po••lble. Ott the other hand, if perSOft 1 rt11taina at ld• uUU.ty 
curve 11 .at A, person It muat remain at tt3, \lltlch tmpUes a <l•creose bl 
utility for person It. 
Ltkewlae it can be shown that lf pel'eon I rematna at Ma indUference 
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' . curve 1 1, which ls tangent to t 3 at B; then II has to remain at 113 'Which 
ts tangent to n 1 at o. The points B and O again are a Pareto optimal 
combination of points for t and II. 
By tracing out all points of tangency of in.difference curves with 
curves of ft14'xlmum possible utility gains for each person, we wlll find 
the curve of Pareto optimal positions for each person. In general only 
the s.it of Par-e:to optimal positions belonging to feasible aoluUons ls of 
ln,terest. A feasible solutton ls a solution of the exchange sU:uatton 
such that no party looses utility. ll'l Flgut'e 3 we have shown the feasible 
set of Pareto optimal positions for person I as the cu.rve AB and for 
perso1'l tI as PE. We may call these curves the contract curves of t.he 
p.ersons. 
As the competitive solution l.s Pareto optimal, it must Ue on these 
contract curves . We have shown. the competitive solution for person t as 
CI and for person U as CU. The points c1 and CII are tdentlcal vith 
those of Figure 2. 
The method used tn thia section to derive the competitive solution 
therefore, may be considered equivalent to the method used in the previous 
sec:Uon. It enables us to derive all the information we can derive also 
from the pre•ious method. The Edgeworth box diagram exhibits one Pareto 
optimal curve but t"'10 origins. The present method exhibit• one origin 
but t"'° Pareto optimal curves. Tlte present method however, can be exten· 
ded to eases of more than two persons as we will show in later sections. 
The cont1'.act curves of both persons need not nlwaya be different . 
tf certain conditions are uthfied, they may be the same £or both 
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persona.. We wUl show one aueh parUeular caae because tt attll caa llhov 
the aapeeta in 111ltch we are tntere1ted. 
Suppose petton.s I •rul II have the ..,. tndtfference curv••• 1Gl«:h are 
orthogOMl hyperbolaa. Suppose further the inlUal poal Uona of peraona 
t and It are on the u. lncllfference curve and a)'lllletrlc with r.apeet to 
the straight 1lne k fl'Oll tha origin with angle of 45° with the x•axta. 
tea Figure 4 we have sho• the particular posttton1 ·Of peraona I and 
11 on their lnltlal lnd1fference curve t 1 • 111• The total amount of 
cOMnDdt ttea la rep:reQ\\ted by the vectol' T(I .tt>. The trading curves of 
p.eX'aona I and II are also a,_tr1c with respect to the line k and lndl· 
cated by t 2 and tt2• They intersect at the pobtt c. At t the dtaaonall 
of the parallelogJ:'am OIT(I.tt)n tntersect ea¢h other perpendicular. 
c 1• the competitive sobstlon. tor thl• parUcular eachanae .attuatton. 
Tbe ourvea of •xt-.. poa1lble UUUty galna of pereont I and II; 
lf the other person remalna Oil hi• 'lnltlal In.difference cvrw, are Sden· 
tlcal. They •l'• t.ndt<;ated by t 3 • 113• 
W. now aaaert that the contract CUl'W& of persona I and tt are the 
8Pll and are htdlcated by the straight line segment AB of k. to ahow 
tbts w may rMark fll'•t that a pt"operty of ortbogon.al hyperbola• ts, 
that every straight Una from the orlgln tnter1ect1 the hyperbola• 
succe•elvely at poi~t• vhlch have all parallel tanaen.t lines. 
The straight line k frOtl the orlgln lnteraecta the i•dlfference curve 
11 • n 1 at A. the tanaent Une at A we ha'" lftdlcated by p. If person 
t la at A, perlOn lt h&• to be at B, vhlcb la also on tht llne k and on 
13 • II 3 • ht. otder for exchange to be possl ble. At B the Une k 
18 
2 
k 
II 
0 l 
Figure 4. A special symmetric exchange situation 
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• • tntuaecta an tndlfference curve aay 11 • n 1• The tangent U11e at B, 
..tltch t• parallel to p, • have tncHcated by q. If perton I move• along 
p1 penon It has to ino'Vtl along fl• Aa p does not Intersect 11 • 111, q 
t:att. not intersect 13 • n 3• Therefore at B the lnd!fference curve . ' t 1 • 111 ta tangent to the cuive 13 • n 3• 
' . on the other baad if person tt moves aloq t 1 • tt1 at B, ptl'IO'ft 1 
• • t ' 
mutt move alona t 3 • tt3 at A. For the same rea*<>n 13 • tt3 la tanpn.t 
to t 1 • tt1 at A. Thenfon the polnta A and Boat"- Une k form a 
comblruttton of Pareto optimal post Uou for persons I and 11. 
Llkevlae it can be shown that for any poslUOl\ of person t on the 
straight line between A 8lld B, pereon It wUl have allO a poaltlon on the 
straight Uu 1-twen A and .I, such tbtt the CoMluttoa of poal ttona 
apln l• Partto optl•l. Fvttbermore for any poaltlon of per80ft t ln the 
region tAltB but not on the etratght Une AB, the poattton of penon 11 
wUl also not be Oft the Une Ma-itt AB. tn that case there will alwya 
be at least ou potnt. for each perton on the etraSght Unt Alh aucb that 
the utlUty of at leaat one person ta b'lcreaaed and auch that •xchanae ls 
poaatble. T'henfoi-e the straight ltne AB 11 th• con.tract curve for 'both 
peraona t 81ld It. 
Only at the competitive tolutlcm potnt c. the poeltlou of both 
pet>1on1 on the cootract curve are at the u• Point. 
D. Naah'a SOlutlon to the Baqatnlng Problem 
A cbaractertatlc 'tlhtch the adjustattt machant•, coutdeftd In the 
previous aeettou maua with the equlltb1;ha theo¥')' app:road1 1 11 that 
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the p.artlea take the prlee of the oomodltlt• •• glven and adjust the 
quanUUea slven any prlce. Tbts ta oertall\ly not the only poaalble way 
partlea can behave in laolated exchange situattons.. A aoluttoa \itltcll 
NY be reached in tM case both pa'l'tlet adjut prlce1 aa well •• qudtl• 
tlea, ta proposed by Nash (4). 
tn "The Bal"galrttng Problesst", ~sh lnveatigatea tile behaVior of two 
pe.rsona llhtch "have the opportwt ty to coUabo:tate foy •tual beef U ta 
more than one wa'f'. The economic st tuatlon of 'bl lateral tllOt\Opoly may be 
considered a• a bargatnlng problem, but also the cau of Isolated barter 
exchange betwen two persons. 
tn 8\DMlarldag the eaaentlal parts of Naab'• contrtbutloQ we vUl 
follow mainly the dlscu11lm of it by Luce and rt.aUf.a (31 P• 124). On tb.e 
o·t:ber hand • vlll sllgbtly adapt the problem in order to •k• lt compara• 
bl• to the tw peraou two coamodlty ••bani• sttvatlon d•tt vltb befon. 
SuppoR two pei-ena t and II have oach on• ~tty. peraon t us 
a certain «RtOunt of cOJm:>dlty 1, peraon It an ..,uat of eo9ll!Odlt7 2. 
Then ext at• no money to f •clll tat• ex.change. A tra4- trua plaq t t each 
p&ny agr.eea to tt~ By a tr1de l1 meattt asi actual i'Upportlot\1111).~ of tbe 
bundle ot '°°" held by pet"aont t and U. We lhaU hppOM ttt.t the 
uttUUes eooc1ated with each poasible trade nttafy tbe Voa NeQlaM md 
Morgeutel"ft axlou of vu Uty theory. 
Of •peclal tntenat 11 the 1ltutlOA \!here no t'tade take• plaec. 
Aa no pereon can force the other parson to a sltuaUd whtch l• ••ae tb..a 
hla lnlttal poattton 1'hen no trade ha• taken place. both pertona are 
aaaured of a gain tn utUlty by the trade, of at least zero. A• w are 
•inly lntereated in the gala ht vUlUy ve may d.•scrlbe the po•ldon of 
no t1'ade at all 41 th• p&blt CO.O) In the 2•dl1111n1lonal graph. of Flgure 5 
showing the poa1tble plu ta utlUty of person t alO'l\I the x·axl• by "t 
a?\d the r>O••lble gala ln utlUty of II alcrng the .Y•axla by "it• 
Wa •uppose fvrt1'er that the eollllllOdStl•• are completely dlvt1lble. 
Actually Nash doe• not allow for divlatbUUy. Instead he aUon for 
11bced 1trate1te1. in the game.. The mixed stt"ateat•• eaable hlm to connect 
the extttme poluts ln the plane by a.tr.algh't Une.s. tn thl• way a set of 
po1atble: uUUty comblnaUons 11 fonsed, ublch 1• by aaauaapttcm compaet 
attd convex and contains the ol'lgln. 
we do not allow for •heed strategtea In order to repreabt the 
proce•• of bidding •• reaUsttcly a• l'O••lble. But the a•..-ptlon of 
tnflnlte dlvtatbUtty of comodttlea accompUllh• even 'liOre tbd the 
aasumptton of mixed atrctesl••· That ls, the nioTtbeast boundary of the 
Mt s of po1alble coatblution• of utility gaift• la cottve• but •Y or my 
not eonstat of straight. Une aeaments. A• the wor•t. poastble atate ta 
ht.d1cated by the po1n.t (O,O) of 'AO gala tn uttUty, the set of poaslble 
conlblaaUona of uu U ty gains i a the compact aQd donvex set s lndleated 
!ft FlguTe S. 
Both persons va11t to trede such that thet~ uttllty gatn la as tueh 
a• po1stble. t .n othet wot'ds perlOn I waate to arrive et a point tn S •• 
far to the rtght as poa1ible and person II tMnta to 1rrtv. at a point as 
htsh as poa1ible. These vt.1hes al'e lncompatlble h' general. Still there 
wUl be trade aeco~dlng to Nash, aa lbtlg aa there are polfttl lft s abc>ve 
and to the right of (O.O). 
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Figure S. The set S of possible utility gains for persons I and II 
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The unique solution propoMd by Nash la nov derived a• follovac ta 
0 0 0 0 the region S find the unique potnt ("t•u11> auch that u1u11 la the maximum 
of all products "tu11 • where (u1,u11> l• ln S l.e., 
(1) 0 0 (u1 •uu> ta a point of s, 0 u1 > O, 0 "tt > o. 
(2) 0 0 utun ~ "tun for all (ut ,uu> belonatna to s auch that 
u1 ~ 0 and "tt } O. 
0 0 The potnt (u1 ,u11 > ta called the Naab solution to the baraalning 
game. The Naah solution la the only point aatlafylng the follovtna four 
aaaumptlona (3, p. 126): 
(1) Invariance wltb reapect to utlllty tranafo111attona. That ta. 
tf the utlllty functions of t and/or tl change orlgta or are ..ultlplled 
by a conatant, the solution polnt muat change by the aa .. procedure. 
(2) Pareto opti .. ltty. 
(3) Independence of irrelevant alternativea. That ta, if the .. t S 
of posaible utility gain• ta expanded, the solution shall be elther the 
exiatlng aolutton point, or ahall be contal••d ln tlMI expanded part of s. 
tf the aet s ia contracted auch that the solution point of the ortatnal 
Mt S aUll Uea ln the Mt, then thla point wlll also be the solution 
point ln the contracted .. t. 
(4) s,...try. That l•• the roles of the player• are co11pletely 
a,anetrlc. 
Althouah we have adapted the baraatnlng aa .. alt&htly for our 
purpoaea, th••• adaption• neither t11plied • change in the aaaumptiona 
about the co actn••• and convexity of s, nor a chana• tn the four 
aaaumpttons •ntloned abo••· Therefore the Nash solution la also the 
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unique aolutton to the •lightly adapted probt ... 
!. A Comparteon betwen the Co11petltlve Solution and the Naeh Solution 
In thta aectlon we vtll co11pare the co11p41ttttw 90lutton of the two 
pertJOn exchange probl .. under complete lnfol'llatton vtth the Naab 
aolutton to the two person bargatntna probt ... eapectally vtth reapect to 
the utl Uttea of the solution. If there can be no confusion we will often. 
call the uttlttlea belonatna to the coapetltlve aolutlon simply the 
competitive aolution. 
A• w know that the Nash solutloa ta the only point aattafytng the 
four aeagapttona. given that the set S of possible utility gatna ta 
compact and convex, ve vUl lnvestlgate succeaalvely lf these condltlona 
are met by the competitive solution. 
Before we actually will do thta however. we need to aay aometbtng 
about the mea11Urlftl of utility. One of the reasons for dropping the 
aesumptton of a cardinal utility function in general equlllbrtum theory, 
was that tt was po11lble to derive meaningful reaulta vttb a lllUCh more 
general aaaumptton. This assumption ta that if a functtoa 11 a uttllty 
function any 1110notone tran&formatlon of lt la alao a utility function. 
The compeUtlve solution as far as the comaodltte1 ts con.cemed la lnva• 
rlant with respect to ID01\otone tran1for11ationa and can therefore be 
derived lf only tht• a••umption 1• used. 
However, thla does imply that little can be •aid about the utllttiea 
belonging to the solution. Suppose for lt\Stance a peraon baa a prefer-
ence ordering over three commodttlea A. B and C indicated by A < c < B. 
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then the peraon my represel\t the utility belonging to A by the l\Ullbn' 
u(A) and the uttltty belonging to B by the mmber· u(B). The Ofl1Y 
r"utnment tllhlch the•• nUtlber& have to aatUfy la that u(A) < u(B). 
Gtven theae numt>ers the only requirement thlch u(C) ha• to .. tlafy l• 
u(A) < u(C) < u(B). 
Tht1 leave• the uUU.t7 of the outcome useless •• at\ objective 
tndtcator other than. of nlative uttUty. At the •aae ttna any •pectflc 
comparison between the competitive solution and the Nash solution can 
not be made. 
Therefore we have to aa•Ull'le that the utUtUe• can be meaaUTed in 
cardinal numbe'r•· More apecUlcaUy • will assume that for both cues 
the utlUty f:unetlon.s of persona I and II are constructed wtth th• help 
of an uUUty asatpment scheme uttsfytng the Von Neumann and MorgtMtem 
extoms of ut1Uty theory. 
As an example of how such a con•tructton would be accomplished let 
u1 consider the contract curve of the special ayinmetl"ic exchange 
sltuatlOf\ of Figure 4. SUppoae we call the comnodlty bundle on tt. 
contJ"act curve 11\.ich la least preferred by peraon l., A, w call the 
coaaodU:y bundle 1'tlch is moat preferred by him cm the contract curve, B 
and the connodity bundle aa1octated with: the competlttve soluUon w 
call c. 
So w have for pe-raon I, A < C < B. Now suppoae with A and B we 
a•eoctate arbitrary utlllty numbe.ra, but auch that u(A) ( u(B) as lndl~ 
eated tn Figure 6. The asaumption uade1'1ylng the Von Ne\11181\1\ and 
Morgeastem axitn• of utUlty theory now 11, that lt la poaalble to 
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Figure 6. Construction of a utility function for person I 
27 
derl'Ve the uttUty of C given the utllttlea of A and B by a certain. 
procedure involving expectation• over random eventa. 
The proCedUl"e ts as followa: The person, ln thla case person t, 
wlll be aaked to say to '*'lch probability comblnatlon of u(A} and u(B), 
u(C) 11 indifferent. 'the pel'ton Is supposed to be neutral to•rda rhk 
taking. Suppose ve find the following relation: 
l 2 u(C) • ;"(A) + ;u<B) 
Then we may plot the utUlty of C ln Figure 6 according to tbh formula. 
By repeating thh process ve may find the utUUtes for person t belong-
tng to all the potnta on the contract curve. We call this procedure an 
uUUty assignment scheme. It ta a linear a11tgnment scheme, becauH tt 
leavea the con1tructed uttllty function undetermln.ed with respect to tts 
ortgln and unit of measurement. 
It ta Important to note that although the assignment scheme deter-
mtnea the conatrueted utt ll t .y function up to a linear transfonaatlon of 
It the constructed utility function itself tn generel will not be ltnear. 
as ta indicated by the situation In Figure 6. 
Now suppose the utility function• of persona I aftd II are constructed 
ln the prescribed mannu. Let us now investigate lf the competitive 
solution satleftes the assumptions of the Nash solution. 
Let us therefore transform t .he region of possible uUUty galns for 
both persons ln Figure 4, Into a set s of possible utl Uty galn• for both 
person• as ln Figure 5. In Figure 7 we show thla. traMformatton. 
Figure 7a ab.ows on the x•axls the begin point A of the contract curve of 
Ft pre 4. the end point B and the point C of the e.oaapett tlve solution. 
u1(B)·un(B 
u1(A)•un(A) 
0 
b 
e 
c 
a 
0 
A 
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Figure 7. a. Possible utility functions of the contract curve 
b. Possible sets S for these utility functions 
As the utility functions of persona I anc! It may be. always trant• 
formed Unearly; we can alwya make the uttllttea for person.a I and It at 
the point A the eame and at the polnt B the lame for both peraona. 'lbta 
w have done ln the figure. The utility of the commodity bundle A ta indl· 
cated by u1(A) • "tt(A). Llkewtae the utility of B ta the aame for both 
persona ~(B) • ~1(B). Aa we are really only lntereated In the gains of 
utlUty and both persona are alwys assumed at leaat of a utUlty of 
~(A) • ~1 (A)• we may take the utUt ty of A for both persons a• the 
ortgtn tn Flgure 7b. 
So we will only trauform Figure 7a tnto Figure 7b with reapect to 
utility gatns. In Ftgun 7a thei-efore we have measured the total utlU· 
ties on the vertical axis to the left of A and the galna tn utUlty on 
the ventca1 axis t .o the right of B. The tnaxlnun poulble uttllty gain 
for ~raon. t in the aet S of Figure 7b ta lndlcated by ~(B) • ~(A) 
and for II by "11(!) • UII(A). 
The procedure for tranaformtng Figure 7a into Flgu'l'e 7b la now as 
follows: For any poaltlOft of person 1 between A and B ln Figure 7a, hta 
utUUy galn belonglng to that poaltlon indicated on the rtght y-axta of 
Figure 7a, la tran1formed to a polnt along the x•axta of Figure 7'b, auch 
that the amount of utUlty gala remains the aame. l1\e y-coordlnate ln 
Figure 7b la found by taking the poaltton of person U between A and B tn 
Figure 7a corq1pondlng to the poaltton of ~rlOl\ I, such that the po•l· 
tlons of peraona t and 11 repreaent a poaalble exchange situation, and 
tranafondna the utlllty gatn for 11 belonging to that poattlon, to the 
y-axta of Figure 7b. 
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Suppoae for tn•tance that the con•tructed utility function for the 
contract curve 18 linear for both per80na •• tndlcated by the line 1 In 
Figure 7a. We know from Figure 4 that lf perlOft I l• at position A, 
pereon II muet be at po1ltlon B In order for exchange to be pos•lble. 
Then the utility gain for person t la 0 and the utility gain of pereon tt 
la uu(B) - un(A). So the uttUty gain of both persona for thla situa-
tion, la Indicated by the point (O,u11 CB) - u11CA)) In Figure 7b. Thi• 
ls the left end point of the curve l ln Figure 7b. 
If pereon I moves from A tn the direction of B tn Figure 7a, peraon 
II must move from B tn the dlrectlon of A ht order for exchange to be 
poaslble. If person t reaches C, person II reach•• lt at the aame tt ... 
Both pereons have the same utility at C as la Indicated by c on the 
curve 1 ln Figure 7a and by the point (c,c) tn Figure 7b. 
Although Figul"e 7a ahowa only the constructed utility function• fo~ 
the contract curve, thh 1• really all what w need to coa•truct the aet S 
of possible utility galas for pereon• t and 11 ln Ftaure 7b. Becauee we 
know that the contract curve ts Pareto optlmel. 'lbt• t11pllea that the 
northea•t boundary of the ut S ln Ftgun 7b ta alwya the tran•fonecf 
contract curve. !ecauH suppose thta ta not the ce•e. Then there ta a 
potnt tn s whlch ta not do•lnated by a point of the tranafoned contract 
curve. This tmpltea that there ts a point tn the region of pos•tble 
utSltty gatna enclosed by the tntttal tndlffer9ftce curve• and the CUTVe• 
of maxltllUftt poa•ible utility gatna, ln Figure 4, 'lhlch ta not dominated by 
a point on the contract curve. Thia la a contradiction. 
So U we know the utllt ttea for both persona belol'lgtng to points on 
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the contract curve, we can find the northeast boundary of the set s. 
Tb.ta lmpllea that w know the whole Ht s, becauH the other boundaries 
are formed by the x•axl a and y-axl •· 
The competitive solution sattsflea the condttlon of Pareto optimality. 
Therefore lt ... t Ue on the northeast boundary of the Ht s. But 
although the northeast boundary ta Pareto optimal, thta doea not determine 
tta shape un.tquely. 
It can be shown that lf the utlUty funeUona of the contract curve 
for both persona are linear aa tndtcated by l tn Ftgure 7a, the tranafor• 
med Pareto optimal curve will also be Unear a• indicated by l ln 
Figure 7b. If the utiltty fun.ctlona of the contract curve are convex as 
Indicated by 2 tn Figure 7a, the northeast boundary of the set s ln 
Ftgure 7b will be convex wlth respect to the origin, a• alao indicated 
by 2. If the utility functions are concave tn Figure 7a al tndtcated by 
3, the northeast boundary wt.U be concave wlth respect to the ortstn ln 
Figure 7b, as sho'111 by l. tf the uttllty function of the contract curve 
ta concave for one person and conv•x for the other, the northuat boun· 
dary of the Ht s •Y have several posal ble forms. 
lt may be Hen now that the utl U ty for each player of the coape-
ti tl ve aolutton. la tnvariant with respect to llnear tranaformationa of 
any or both of the utility functions of persons I and It. That la, tf 
we multiply the utility 14tna of any or both players tn Figure 7a by a 
poaltlve eoutant, the utUtty aalna of any or both persona tn Ftgure 7b 
change by the lall'8 procedure. 
We wtll now check the aaaumptlon of lndepenclence of irrelevant 
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altematt.ves. We vlll llhow that the •••umpUon ta not aatlafled by aa 
example. A solution p<>int of the set s of pos1lble uUUty galna ia not 
independent of lrrelevaat altemattve1, 1f w can con•truet a tmaller 
set s, wblcb •tl 11 contain• the solution point of the lni tUl .. t s, but 
auch that the solution ta now another point. 
Suppoae that th• curwa 2 and 3 in Figure 7a al'• auch that tf w 
tum line 2 180° tn the plane around c, it cover• 3 completely. Now 
suppose the utility curve of both persona I and It ta 2 tn Figure 7a. 
11ten the uttlity galn. of the contpetttlve solution for both peraons ii 
lndtcated by the point (a,a) of Figure 7b. 
But now euppoae the utUtty curve 1• 2 for person 1 tn Figure 7a and 
3 for II. Then by conatructlon the Pa"to optlul curve ln Figure 7b 
will be the straight line 1. Moreover the utility gain of the CC>lllpetltlve 
aclutlon for both peraons will be the point (a,b) on thla Une because at 
C tn Figure 7a person I baa a utility gain of a and person 11 of b. tn 
the same vay U ve change the roles of persoas t ad It aucb that the 
utlllty curve of person I nov la 3 in Figure 7a and of 11 11 2, then the 
utlllty 1atn of the competltlve solution wlll be the point (b.a) on the 
line 1 ln Figure 7b. 
So the point of uttUty galas for pertona t and 11 belonging to the 
COtlP•tltlve 11<>lutlon chana•• for different utlltty fun.cttol\I of persons t 
and tl. It can be ahova, that the point of utility gain• ln FlgU?'e 7b 
may be any polnt 01\ the line 1 dependl'ft& upon the particular for11 of the 
utility fun.etlona lft Ftaure 7a. 
Now suppoH the coapetttlve solution i1 potat (a,b) in Figure 71:>. 
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w.. have to 8hov tbat (a11>) vUl not be the tiOlutlon point of the aat s1 
If we mak• t\Ma Mt s 1&1alltr such that (a,b) ta •till eoatatftfld ln tt. 
We accompllah thl• by ooutructlq tvo utUU:y cunes tn Figure 1a wlth 
the um a,._trtc ptoperttea a• the flrat Unea, but both closer to the 
11• 1. The•• Unea we have ebOtl\ by the daahed nrve 4 for .penon. I ad 
5 for peraol\ tt tn Figure 7a. Thla att11 teavea the northu•t boundary 
ln Flgun 71> as the .atratght Uu t. 
So (a,b) wtU atlll be. oa this Uae. Uo.-vu (a,b) vtll not anymore 
'lMt the aolutton. to the problem, as may be ..- by fltldlng the uttUtte• 
belonging to the compett tlve solution a• the tnt•r..cttcm of the vwttcel 
llu at C ln rtaun 7a vi.th tl'Ma dashed utUtty functions. 1.'ht MW COllpe• 
tltlve aolutton we hava lo.dlcat•d by (cl1•) tn Fll\lft 7\l, So w Med Ollly 
to make the aet s .. u.er to have a result. To accoatpllah thl• w •7 
ake CUZ'YG S ltt Flgwe 7a sllghtly le .. ccmca• owr a re.nae •tch wlll 
not effect the 801utlon and thtr poaltlon of point (a,b) ln Figure 7b. 
So the reau1t ta that. the point of utlUty a.tu for pu•na l and It 
belonatna to the eompetlttve aolut.ton ta not lndeptmchmt of tneltmmt 
altemattvea. 
FluUy lt nay be •- that the eoaspetttlve 10lutloa doe• allo not 
1atlsfy the aanmpttOl\ of .,_.try. 'ftte .. t s la rtaun 7b vlth aorth· 
eaet bo\11\d.ary 1, la c;oaspletely •,_t.S'lc. 11111 would tmply that the 
aolutton wuld be th• point (c1c) In ol'Clu to utlafy the aa-.r>ttcm. ot 
.,...t..,.. We haw alnady aeea that the aol\lttOI\ •Y be •ftJ point on 
thl• u •. 
So • have found that the point .of utlllty plu belcm&lft& to the 
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C01Bpetltlve aolutloft aatlaflea only two of the four •••UllJ>tlona of the 
Naah solution, ~ly the aaaumpUon of lnvarlance with reapect to Un.ear 
traftefoTmatlona ancl the aaaumptton of Pareto optl11allty. 
There only r-emalna to be lnveatlsated the condl tton of cOMpactneaa 
' and convexity of the aet S of poealble utlllty gatna. A aet ta said to 
be ce11pact lf lt la cloaed and bounded. The flnlte numbers aHlgned to 
the uttlltlea of the contract curve imply that the boundedneaa condition 
la aattafled. The Pareto optimality of the contract curve lmpltea that 
the boundary ta lnchlded ln the set S. FurtheTmOre the boundarle• of the 
aet S conalstlng of the ax.ea are also included ln the set. 
Ae the dtacuaelon of Figure 7 already aholled, the set S of poaelble 
utl U ty gatna for perlOfta I and tI, "longing to the bl lateral exchange 
case, need not be convex. £apeclally when the utlllty function• of both 
player• are convex the northuet boundary will also be convex. '11\enfore 
the competltl-.e aolutlon vtll not aattafy in general the condition that 
the aet S of poastble utlltty gains ta convex. 
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t tl. A SPECIAL UYPO'mESlS 
A. lntroductlon 
In tht• chapter we will ftrat state the condltlona under llhlch ,.. 
want to conalder the 180lated exchange attuatton. Next w will tnveatl• 
gate the u.fulnea• of the compeU th• solution and the Nalh aolutlon 
under these condtttont. Finally ve .uggeat and crltlclze a apectal 
aolutton baaed upot\ the crttlclam of the competltl"19 solution aad the 
Nash aolut1o1l. 
B. Special Aaamptlona 
In the f trat place we want to reatrlct ourselves to the caae of 
isolated exchange under complete lnfol'llatlon. '11\la certainly would be a 
NVere Umttatlon tf ve ware mainly concerned about the aolutton of the 
Isolated exchange situation as such. For the case of taolated acbange 
may be conalder.ed aa a pecultar balanced st tuatlon of lillch the aolutlon 
will be determined mainly by factors not lmCNl beforehand. the partlea 
may aet out to find the determining factors of the solution by a bar· 
galntng pl'OCeaa ,.\lch la at the a.- tl• a learning process about the 
determtnlng factota the other party may have and a htdtng process of the 
determining factors the person htuelf may have. In short lt la oftm 
aatd that the solution of the taolated exchange •ltuatlon vtll be deter-
mined ln a great deal or tn part by the partlcul.ar baqatntna 1kUla of 
the parties. 
We wUl not consider these apeclflc determining factors. That ta, 
we wUl eJCClude the eff•ct of baraall\lftl •kUls upot'l the aolutloth tf we 
exclude th•• effeet• tll\der coapltte lnfol'Utton, lt •Y be poaalble to 
uy 80fllethlng about the tn.fluenoe of spectflc otber factol"•· tn parttw-
lar we want to take into eonalderatlon the effect on the aoluUc:m of 
tnterperS'OMl eomparlsoa of utl U ty. To N able to do that tbuefore, • 
have to asl\al that interpersonal eomparlaon of uUUty ts poaatble at 
.u. 
More expllcltly, we vtU assume tlult the ut11lt1es of peraona are 
representable thmugh a. llnear utlltty assignment achem aattefytng the 
Von NeUtial\t\ and Morgenstern. a:idmu o.f utlUty theory and such that the 
utUttle• of all pe-nona are measu.-ed wlth respect to the same origin ad 
are multlpU«d by the Ntftl constant. 
We WS.11 asll\lle a barter economy tn •tdl no explt.ctt prtcee eJttst 
but oaty excb4nge ratios. MJ.y party makes blds la the market apectfytng 
the amount of -.ch C»'llWDOdlty he offers ta ucbmge foi- a speetftt aniount 
of another or other eomnodl tlea. Fol' abapltclty d-.wtd aa1 be eousld1nred 
aa a negative of fttr. Of eour1e these exetump rat lo• •Y be conahlered 
aa accounting prices. 
F\lrthenore w vent to con•ider the excbaft&• proce•a u a spt1etf1c 
game. In ord•r to " able to conaltl•r the situation aa a came at all, 
certain condltlcma have to be s.attsfted. Xn general a game la noraal 
form eonatata of (3, p. SS): 
(l) The set of n players 
(2) n sets of pure .atrategles. one Mt fol' eeeh playet 
(3) n linear payoff funct.tooa, one for ••h player • .tu>ae values 
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depend upon the strategies of all the players. 
The Unear pa)'Off fun.ctlona we have called be.for• Un.ear utUity 
assignment .schemes. '11ley have to aatiafy the aaaumptlon. of tnterperaonal 
comparlaon of utility. '"'- players are also assumed to have full know-
ledge ·of all the atr•tegy set a and all the payoff functions of the 
players. '11\ey are also rational. that ta they wUl alwaya choose the 
alternatives wlth largest uttUUea. 
Of all the possible game.a we wlll choose further the claas of games, 
ln 'filhlcb no preplay communlcatloft ts pcaatble. Thla lmpllea at the .um 
time that w will not allow for bl-.tlag agreements. 'l1le class of gmnea 
ln wblch no pAplay comuntcation ts a:Uowd ln order t .o form binding 
agreements, ts called the class of non·cooperatlve game1 (3, p. 89). 
As the theory of samea as developed by Von Neumann and Morgen1tem 
(8), allows for preplay CODlllUl\lcation, ve can not apply the result• of 
this theory to our cases. It ls exactly the incorporation of all possible 
results of preplay COllllU\lcaUon in the solution, which p1".Vel\ts th~ 
from deriving tolutlona 11\ terms of unique points for general a-person 
games. 
'11th la certainly unsatisfactory •• far a1 the economic: interpre-
tation of the theory l.$ concerned. Many attempts have 'been made to derive 
more apeclflc result• by atUl ustng the method ot game theory~ Nash (S) 
attacked the problem of preplay communication by conatderlng it also tn 
terms of game theory. In excluding preplay coiamunic.atlon we suppose to 
vork ht the same aplrtt. lt seems to us that the results of the same 
theoretic approach should not depend on conslderatiou not dealt with 
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expUettly wt.thln the bod.y of the theory. tn terma of pne theor1 w 
could ••Y that th• nsult o.f the game under cona.tdel'atloa lbovld not 
depend on prevtout .._,of •t.eh the l'fumlta are not knowrt. 
But the excluaton of pnplay COftlJUftlcauon •• auch doe• not guann• 
tn • solutlOll litttch lt mon detendute. ta order to arrtve at more 
1peoltte solutions therefot"e w have to look foi- other poaalbltltlea 
allowable wt.thin the gmae tbtory aet up. 
As we want to use the tool• of game theory lit order to tmre1Ugate 
e'JCChange behavior, a method udch pl'eeenta Itself naturally ls the 
posa1'b1Uty of repeated playing of a &&me• The repetition of the play• 
may "- coatpered to the repeated l>lddlng es dealt wt th tn the previous 
chapter. At any play we will only allow for stng1e atrategtea. A 1n0n 
detailed dea.crtptton of the repeated play of the g.- vtU be given 
later on.. 
Thrcugh the process of repeated pl•yl'ftl of a game eOtMU!ltcatlon la 
eatabltshed. l>etween the players. "l'ht.1 comanuntcatlon •Y er uy mt lead 
to aare...,.ta, •tch are only blndlt\8 tf the game ls termtaated lmedl· 
ately after agreement la nacbed. The rules of the aame therefore detu• 
1rdt1.e t1te po•alb1Uty of binding •are-.nts. The repetltlon. of the plays 
allows fo'r the· po•alblU:ty of coope:r•tton between p1ayea-a. At th« _. 
tlme lt allow ua to tnvestlgate lf there 11 reaSOt\ to expect certain. 
apectflc typea of cooperat1011. tf this l• the case, tt will cable ua to 
be •n speclflc also about the aolutton of the particular game. 
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c. A Crlttctem of the Compettttve Solution and the Naah Solution 
tn this aeetton • vUl dtscuas tb reaaonablea••• of the t:OlllM'tttlve 
1olutl0l\ a'Ad the N4•h 10luUoa aa • solutiOl\ of the special type of iso-
lated exchange aituatlon we want to eonald.-. 
In geMl'al the ctlffer•c• betweett the: Nash aoluUcm and the competl· 
ttve aolutlon seenJI. to be tut the Na.tt solution ls based upon tM prln• 
otpte, that at tty tl10fle1lt the dtvtalon. of utiUtl•• must be •• equal aa 
posalble, 1ihlle the competlttve aolutton la based upoa the pl'f.nctple, 
that the person "1o '411 1ncna•• hi• utility t11>lt from. th• acqulrtng of 
a certain commodity will also indeed tncreaae bl• uUUty moet. 
Fll\ll'e 8 cleraonttrates thta. Figure Ba shows two pos•tble utUtty 
curves for eaOh per90n of the eOl\tuct cuive of Plgu:re 4. Ftpre Sb show 
tlwl bouadary of the aet S of poaaible uttUty aat.u, t:s.rlved from these 
curves. If 1 tn Fl&\B'e S. ta the utility curve of peraon t and 2 of per-
son It. the the competltlv. aolvttoa i• c1 tn Figure Sb. If 1 ta the 
uttllty curve of per1an 11 and 2 of person t ln rtpre Sa, then c11 ls 
the ¢Olll>etltlve 10lutlon In Ftgur• lb.. The Nash aoluthm h lndtcated by 
N ta Flptl'e Sb. 
At the kginnlng of the UCMft&• both pat.lea haw• uUUty of 
'i:(A) • "'tt(A). We see that the compet.ttlve •lution 1n.cru•e• moat the 
utt. U tJ of the .,.rson vl th ateepe•t utt l tty ht 11 at A. Oft the other' hand 
the Naab solution disregard• any difference ln utUtty hUls attd d.lvtdes 
the uUUttaa equaUy among the peraou. Ye may alto say that the Nash 
aolutson tends to equa11ze uUUUe•, whUe the competitive solution tends 
to equaUze commadlttes. 
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Figure 8. a. Possible utility functions of the contract curve 
b. Possible solutions in the set S 
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Dl•reprd1ng f01: the moment the reaaonablenes;a o:f each of the ao1'1· 
ttona per •• and the effect of 1n.terpersonal Coatparlaon of uttllt.i••• lt 
seems to ua ttu.t the llkeUbood of oq of these solution• wt 11 depend 
upon the clrcuataftC•• under .tlich ~he e~e tues place. 
sµppoac for lnst41'l0• th.tt the exchanat eltuatlott represented ltl part 
by Figure S• happen• only once urlder complete cert•lnty. 'then, as both 
perton• 'ftltad to cooperate for a solution, tt ••- reaaonable that the 
solution 'Will be clote to the Naab ao1utton. Act\1a1ly then ls aome 
qpe-rJftWCltal support for tht• r•asontq. tn •aa.raatatng al'M! Croup 
Ddlston Maldngtt (7), Siegel and P'ourat<er ):eported the expertlMftta they 
cot\ducted in order to t.eat:: ••veral hypo~he••• a'bov.t solutions of the 
bllateral monopoly ca .. under equal b'arg.ainlq strength, 
A linear model •• develope4 ta lidch the parties ln the bllateral 
tllOl\Opoly c••• wre a single buyer and .d •lqle seller of one eommodtty. 
Fro• the Unur model papoffa wre d•dved for qWtlltlty•prtce colll:dna-
tlou. . 1.'be: pa,.,tfs wre In mDMY• FurtNiermor• tthe ut S ot poutble 
utility gatna, if eOl\ltl"UCtect, would be ayaaetdc with the Panto optlmal 
¢urve fonatng the n.otthea•t bo\ll\da:ry belll& a atralaht UM. 'the teata 
Wl'• perfoftlBd Wl th atUdettt• ln th• ro1ea of bUyft' and seller. SAcb 
student nc•lved the tnformatlOI\ neee•aary to perform the speclflc •Jt.Perl· 
ment. 
one per~ •• randon'll)' •••lpect to make the fll'•t btd to th.e oth•r 
person. Af,ter recetvlna the bld the other pel."aon could aceept the btd or 
•k• aJ10tb.a bid. '1'h4I btddltta wa allowed to contll\ue for a sped.fie 
ll1ftl>Ul\t of time. The part.lea had to try to reach aar ...... t within that 
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Unto in order to receive the tllOfteY payoffs belonatna to tht uUUttes of 
the eoluUcn. 
we could derl ve f .:rom Flgure 4 a stat tar payoff matd :x •• uaed by 
Slqel and Fouraker. Of particular interest for u.1 an the retult• et the 
experiments e<mdueted uncltr ecnoplete tnfonaatlott. of both buyer and 
Hlle1' (7, p. .$8). Cf the eight couples Wlch conducted the e~ertment. 
sbc. tUvlded the joint payoff tn. half fll'ld the other t.w almoat in lullf. 
The. aix which tUvtded the Joint payoff in half• also na.ched a Pareto 
1;tptlmal point, the. other coupl•s almoet. Theae results therefoh ay be 
lrtterpl'eted o.a sUpporUng the Nash HlutSoa for symttdc ••hanae attua .. 
tlont \1btch occur onl7 oace. 
Ott the otlurr hand, if the exchaftP ts repeated 1evuel times 'WI th 
the utUlty curve• of persons I and tI changing over Ume aad tf fvrther· 
mo:re th• tnformatlon ls tncoepletlt tueh that uch party knowa only his 
own uttUty curve,. it •Y veU 1- that the costs involved ln reaching an 
equal dtvtalon of the payoff each tl• are moTe than of fHt by the 
average galtt tn uUUty if the eompettUve solution f.a ace41Pted a• aolu• 
tlon each ttme. 
Al the eicperimnt• conducted by Sl•ael and Fouraker (7; p. 70) .. show, 
even t.f the exchange sttuatlon occurs only once under incomplete lftforma-
tion. the reaults deviated al1'eady lllOl'e fro• an equal apUt solutlOA, 
although they did not tend mo:re to the competitive solution. A• they d14 
1\0t conduct repeated experlmn.ts by th• Ame per.sou, w C41'1. not support 
our t-easontng turther by e~dmental evidence from th•tr expert.en.ts. 
llow.ver •• - wtll deal oaly wtth exch4f\Se •ttu.a.tton1 mtcb occur 
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only once, we may coneentrate on the Nash solution •• auaaeated by the 
ruulta of the experimn.ta. In order to lnwattgate the rumonableneaa 
of the Naah solution for the particular exchange altuatloM • vim.t to 
consider, let us look again at the four 888\Dptlons wlch the Naab 10tu-
~lo1\ bas to satlafy. Furtbel"lftOre let us conelder also agaln the condl· 
tlons of compactusa and conwxlty of the set s. For a detal led di•· 
cuaslon of the crttlclama of the four ••sun1Ptlona 111hlch the Na.ah aolutton 
has to utlsfy, w refer to Luce and Ralffa (3, p. 128). Wa vUl 
aumaarlse only the objectlon1 relevant to our dlacu••ion. 
For convn.lence • vUl •tart vlth assumption 4 al\d vorlc back to 
asaUlllption 1. Asaunptlon 4 re<tulr•• l)'llDltt')'. It aeema to us that this 
la a reaaonable auumpUon. A prol>lem artau however 'tlllen oue peram 
acts on bl• own behalf and the oth~ person acts on behalf of a group of 
persons. We will eJCClUde this poaatbtltty. 
the aaaumptlon of lndependance of lttelevant alternatives ha• been 
the object of nvan criticism. The crltlct• mostly take• the fora of 
n example of compartaona of two extr ... ly different sets of utllity 
gatna, but such that the tolutton polnt ts atUl the U11e according to 
the atisumptl on. 
We do act f .. 1 that this crttlcl• l• relev•nt to the. Naab .aolutton. 
It Heu to U8 that moat of the crtt1ct8lll really t• dlrectecl towards the 
aaaumpt1on of no interpersonal comparlacm. of utlltty vlth "1llch ••.-P• 
tion w vUl deal later on. Although we do not agree therefore vtth the 
crlttct81118 agalnat the aaSU11ptton of independence of Irrelevant alter· 
nattvea. we still wlll not require thl• assumption for our specific 
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hypothesis. The reaaou ve will explain later on. 
'11te a~tlon of Pareto optlmaltty we vlll diacuaa Sn combination 
with the asaumptlon of convex! ty of the set s. we have aeen already 
before that the set S of po1aible uti Uty gains, derived frot1 the ngton 
betwen the indifference curves belonging to the iftitlal poaltlons of 
the persons in Figure 4, 1• not convex in general. 
Therefore we have to drop the convexity aseu.ptton lf we want to 
deal with more general cases of bilateral excha'nge. But we may replace 
the convexity asS\lllptlon ln part by an assumption lihlch naturally 
presents itself, namely Pareto optlmaltty. We have aeen already th.at if 
the set S represents the possible utlltty galna ln the bilateral exchange 
case of Figure 4. the northeaat boundary must be the tt'ansformed contract 
curve. Thia curve la Pareto optimal. 
But the exchange •ltuatlon dealt wlth in FlSUT• 4 la rather apectal 
a• we have aeen. If we aaaume Pareto opthnalt ty of the northe.a1t bound· 
ary of the set s. we have to show therefore wlch exchange sttuattona tn 
general &10 -shgw 1r Pareto optimal boundary of the att s. we wUl show 
later on aa w deal wlth two person and three peraon exchange sttuationa, 
\.mder which condltlons the. northeast boundary of the aet S will certainly 
I ' 
be Pareto optimal. At thts partlcul•i- point 1t •Y be seen. that the 
aortheaat boundary will not be Pareto optimal, if the utlltty function of 
one peraon la decreasing and the utlllty function of the other person ls 
lncreaalng over the NM domain. The caae of inferior good• for one 
person could exhibit the property of a decreasing utlllty f\metton. 
So w aaaume that the aet s la compact and has bo~rles conatsting 
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of the non-negaU ve axes and a Pareto optbnal curve between thete axes. 
Aseumptton 1 states that the soluti011 point taUst be invariant wlth 
respect to Uaear utl Uty tran.aformattona. Thia aasumptton lmpUcltly 
•••Ulll• that t nterparaonal compar1 aona of utt U t y can not be made. That 
ts, if the uttUty function of P41raon l reealn• the ..- and the utility 
funetlon of person It ts RNltlplted by a conatartt and has added a 
constant to l t, the aolutlon remains the 1ame for person t. We know that 
the conapettttve aoluttcm can also be derived 'Without the aaaumptlon of 
interpersonal comparteon of uttllty. 
As we have indlcat4h! all"eady, we want to consider taolated exc:banp 
cttuattona lf interpersonal comparison of uUUty la poaalble. *4t will 
he the effect on the Naab solutlon l f lntarpei-aonal comparlacm of uttlU:y 
ta poaatble? Let ua again follov the dtacusston by Luce and Ratffa 
('.), t>• 130) • 
tn Figure 9, we have sho'Wft two different &ets S of possible uUUty 
&alns for pe~JOns I and tt. tn Figure 9a the situation is completely 
eymmetdc and the Nash solution ls the point (5,S). In the ease of 
Figure 9b the attuatton ls as,..trtc and the Na•h solution ta the point 
(S,50). 
!ut lf lrtterpersonal comparison of utlllty ls possible, 1& (5,50) 
then a •fall"' aolutlon? That l•, 11 tt reaeonable to expect that perton I 
will cooperate wlth peraort tI to get this solution? Person I uy aaaui. 
that the point (9,9) of equal dlvlslon. of the uttllty galns ta a fair 
dtvtelon on the basis of the arguments that both persons surted at the 
point <o.o) .net th1&t there ta no reAaon to decide upon an aa~tdc 
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Figure 9. a. A s~ranetric set S for persons I and II 
b. An asynunetric set S for persons I and II 
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solution tf the initial poaltiona are sytm1etrlc. Pera.on I may aupport 
ht• arguments by thre•teftlng not to cooperate for any •olutlon different 
ff'011 (9,.9). Re may gain. nothing if no agreement la reached, but then 
person II wl 11 also galn nothing. 
On the other hand person 11 may -rave that any aolutlon different 
from (.5,50) ta unfair, because only at (5,50) each person galna half of 
hta tnaxl11UD poaalble utlUty gain. Person I would again argue that for 
hlm the maxlua1D poaalble utility gaina are not the basic reference points, 
but the frtltial position.a and therefore ••••• 
'11th type of argument certainly does not sugge-st a unique aolutlon 
to the ltolated exchange situation. It does auggest however t.h.at the 
solution will be within. a certain range with endpoint on the one aide the 
solution W.ich dlvldes the poaelble utility galn.a ln half and on the 
other aide the ~ab solution. 
D. A Special Hypothe•l• 
In the prevloua section wt a1'gued that the Naab solution would be a 
_,re Ukely solution of the isolated exchange alt.uatlon, if no laterper-
$0Ml COlllP•rtson. of utUlty •• allowed, than the coape.Utive aolutt.on. 
Rowvu th• Naah 90lutlon ta baaed upon certain as1wmapt1ona "'11ch w want 
to relax. The baalc cbaqea we vant to mke are that the Mt S of 
posalble utility gatna need not be convex. RO\alver the northeast bound· 
ary abou.ld be Pareto optlal. P'ul'thermore ,.. wnt to con.alder inter· 
personal comparlaon of utility po1alble. ~· wlll atUl require that the 
solution .. tlsfles the asaumptlotUJ of Pareto optimality and ,,_..try. 
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Let ua CO'Aalder therefore a nt s of po"lbl• utlUty aatu. vlth 
northeaet boundary not concave to the origin but Pareto optl•l and 
further wlth different maxi ... poaatble uttltty gatu fo'r per10u I and 
It. The set s may be conaldered representing a tw perlOft tw c~dit·y 
e.change situation. 
Flgul"e 10 shows such a set s. The northea1t boundary of the &et la 
the Uae AEHNB. We have dram two atraight llnee, AB and N:.. AB la the 
straight line connectlq the endpoint• of the Pareto optl•l curve. 1.'be 
atret,sht line AC eonnecta the endpoint A vt th a point on the y•axl• at 
equal dt1tance from the origin aa A. 
Consider Hnt the triangle OAB. tf the persorta would dlvtde the 
poaatble utiltty gains in half• the aol\lUon Wl')Uld be P" P ta the inter• 
section of the Une through (A1A) vlth the Pareto optl•l curve. If the 
peraona would decide to maximize the p1:0duct of their uttllty gatu, that 
ta if they decided that the Na•b '°lutton would be the tolutlon, the 
tolutte>n point wo\lld be R. R la the intersection of the Une thTOugh 
(A.10 with the Pareto optimal curve. 
we could uy that the point R ta the solution lf there 11 no inter· 
personal eomparlson of utlllty •t all. Any change ln the utility of one 
per80l\ does not affect the other pereon as far as the aolutlot\ ta con· 
ce.med. Ot\ the other hand the point P could be cOMtdered the aolutton 
lf there vaa an extreme effect of lnterpeX'Sonal compartaon of utility. 
such that any change In utUlty of one peraon wuld affect the other 
peraon a1 well as far •• the solution ta c01\Cerned. 
The bypotbesla 11 now, that for the special ea•• of the tet s belft& 
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the triangle OAB, the solution point vlll be the llne th-rough the points 
rx'P + (1 • °' )tt 0 ,< o< t 1 4 
That la. we assume that the effect of the lnterperSOftal compartaoa of 
utUlty vlll be that the soluUoa vlll l:le somnhere be.tveen the Nub 
solution and the aolutlon ~re both persona dlvtde the utlllty gatna in 
half. In the case that B • A, the pol11ta P and R vUl be the sa• and the 
aolutton will be a division of the utility galna tn half. 
We have used the restriction that the set s la the triangle OAB. 
'11uat is, the aet s was atUl convex. Nov let ua conalder the •et S with 
northeast boundary A.Elum 'filhteb ta not convex. The Une through (A, A) 
Intersects the Pareto optimal boundary at E and the 1lne through (A,B) 
at N. N hovever can not be an~re considered as the Naah solution. 
Thia implies that we can not in general uae the Naab solution ae one 
endpoint of the range of poastble aoluttoaa. 
However another c.andtdate for endpoint suggest• itself aa the Inter• 
aection point of the ltne through (A,B) 1idth the Pareto optlal cune 
l .e., the point N. The hypotheata ts therefore that the solution of the 
exchange eltuatlon represented by ~ .. t S of poaatble utility gains 
wl th northeast boundary AEJttm wl 11 be the tntersecUon of the Pai"eto 
optimal curve vlth the line thi-ough th• point; 
o< E + (1 • ()( )N 0 ,< o< " 1 5 
In general if we call the endpoint• of the Pareto optimal curve of 
ny aet s, A and B, and lf we call the tnt.ersection of the Une through 
(A,A) with the Pareto optimal curve E and the lntersec:Uon of the Une 
through (A,B) with the Pareto optimal cul"Y'e N, then the solution ac:cordtns 
Sl 
to the bypotheals will be the intersection of the Pareto optimal curve 
With the line through the potnti 
o< E + (1 • 0 )N O,< "',< 1 6 
Baalcally thta hypotheaia considers only the endpoint• of the Pareto 
optimal curve as determining factors of the aolutton. More apeclfically 
the hypotheal• neglects the effects of the particular ahapea of the 
Pareto optimal curves on the solution. 
We might consider the point E as the beat possible aolutlon for one 
person and the point N as the woTat poaalble solution. Then fo1'11Ula 6 
might be conaldered as a weighted average between the beat and 'filOrat 
poaatble aolutton for a person. Thia would retail\d of the Hurwlc& 
peaalalam-optimtam index criterion for decision ..aktng under uncertainty 
(3, p. 282). The resemblance la only superficial howvert a• the lturwlcs 
criterion ia applied to each strategy of a person in order to determine 
hla optimal strategy, "'ile the formula 6 determlnea a aolution for one 
particular exchange situation. 
If o( • 1 tn fol'llUla 6, the peraons will divtde the po••lble utlllty 
gains in half at the Pareto optlul curve. tf of\ • O, they will dlvtde tt 
on the Pareto optimal curve det•ntned by the ratio of their maxtaaa 
possible utility gains. If the Pareto optltaal curve is concave this 
implies that they Will divtde the possible utility gains close to or 
equal with the Naab solution. 
The exact value of "' may be detentined by experiment rather than by 
reaaoning. For convenience howver ve will aall'Ulll8 that .t • ;. We have 
aho~ the solution for "' • • in Figure 10 aa H on the Panto optimal curve. 
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E. A CrlticlSUt of the llypothesia 
In thls section we will lnveatlgate some of th• llmttatlons of the 
hypothesis. Flret of all, tt will be shown that the a.asumptton of 
invariance with respect to linear utility transformations and the ••IUllP· 
tlon of independence of irrelevant altemattves are not aatlsfted. 
Suppose the aet S of possible uttltty gatna for penona I and II ta 
the triangle OAB tn Figure 10. 'nle utllitles of the solution of the 
bilateral e>llChange altuattotl are tl\dtcated by the polnt Q according to 
the fo111Ula 6. Now suppose we .-sltlply the utilitlea of p«traon tt such 
that B becomes the point c. Then the point Q U tranaforn.d ln the 
point u. tn order therefore that the assumptlot\ of invariance vlth 
respect to linear utility transformation is satlafted• the solution llJSt 
be u. Hovever applying the fol'a.tla 6 to the new •ttuatlon the aolutlon 
wUl be the midpoint T between A and c. Aa T 1' C the assumption la not 
satisfied. 
To tnveatigate the asaumptlot\ of independence of irrelevant alter· 
natives let us sUahtly change the Pareto optimal curve AEHNB of the 
eet S 1n Figure 10, aueb that w get the Pareto optimal curve DEHNB. 
The nev set S ls smaller than the Initial set s and still contains the 
solution point H of the initial aet. According to the aaaumptton, H must 
also be the eolutton of the new set s. AB the point D ta to the left of 
A however, the point N on the Pareto optimal curve vUl mow to the left. 
As the potnt E remains the same, the point H must alao move to the left. 
thetefore thla aaaumptlon l• also not aattafled. 
Although theae apectftc asaumpttona are not satisfied, thta need 
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ftOt to argue agaiut the hypotbe11s. We would rather •Ull••t th.at tt 
• .,.... a&alut the a••\1ftlPtiona, l f the hypo theft.• may be considered u a 
reatonable explanattort of behavior 'Uader: the spectflc ctrcumatuc••· 
Finally w see t"-t the aaampttons of aynmetry and Pareto optlmaltty 
an aat:lafied. 
A more aertot.Ja nttt<:lam might be di.-ected towards the fact that oaly 
tbe endpoints of the Pareto optl•l cutve have ef feet on the solution 
through their poaltlon ht che fora1a 6. Thls htpllea that tf the malUUt 
poa1tble utility pins of both persons an equal, they w111 dtvlde theh: 
uUUty gains equally, W.teve't •r be the form of the Pareto optimal 
eurve. 
tn Flaure 11 w have shown three poaatble Pareto opU•l nol'thea•t 
bound4rles of the ••t s. clch ta such that the maxlmum possl'ble uttllty 
galnt of person• t and It are equal. Let \II flrat COftSl<!eT the curve l. 
Tbe 90\utton. polat actonltq to the fol'llUla 6 l• the point (a,a).. Nov tt 
•1 seea reaaon.able th4t pereon t w\ild be able to get 4 1t ttle bl t •n 
thaa the amoUllt a from Che exth4nge bec.auae he can tncreaae bl1 utUtty 
pin greatly wlthout reducing th• utility gain of tl very -..ch. 
'11lt formula neglect• tbe poestbUlttes sunoUNllq: the propo*td 
aoluUon, by ••sumtna that p•raon tt ~Ul sti(lk to the •••• tha.t both 
persoms have eqva1 maxtoaum poaalble utlUty gatu and therefore wtll not 
cooperate for any solution other than ao equal dlvtslon of the utUlty 
satna. 
Of CO\lrM lt makes a area:t dlfferenc• if the exchange •ltuatiOJl 
ocoura only once, or occurs r•t>Utedly over tlme. 'l1\e hypothe•la only 
b 
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Figure 11. Three possible northeast boundaries of the set S 
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deala wltb the caN .of exchange taking place only onee. B«:au•e aa soon 
as we auppose that the eicchange sltuatlon oceul'• an t.ndeflntte number of 
u-.s, each per80t\ can b.-fh greatly by cooperating •U<:h that the jotnt 
utt11tlea, are •xlmlutd over time. tn the c.ae of the e.onvex curve 1, 
this would imply that person I would recetve all the uttUty galn at one 
exdulnge attuatton and It at the next ancl "° n. Beca~•• aiven the 
particular fora of the cuJVe 1,. • eollbtnatlon of tl«.>· 1eluti0l\8 wl11 
yteld n equal or anater total utlllty &aln and at the ume ttme dlVld• 
it ln half between pereone t and 11. 
Now let us coutder the N>t'theast boundaries 2 and 3 together. The 
C\fl'Ve& 2 and 3 are ,,._trtc around the Une ~ • '\t • the tolutlon 
point• are (b,'b) ar&d (c,c) respectively. ·?he· polnt (c,o) •• ._ a very 
reaeoruable aolutlon point for d•• patttcular behaqe sltuatJon, 'beeaua 
not only the role• of perlOft• t and n are completel1 a,_.tric but •leo 
because the hm of the utUtty aatna ta 1111Jdmtzed at thts polnt. 'ttutt la, 
even lf the eJCIChanae ettuatlon ls repeated (e,e) seems to be naacmable 
aa a 801Utl on. 
At the potnt (b,b) on curve 2 however the am of the utlUty galus 
of the t'10 peraoM te t\Ot •xtmlsed at a 110vemnt avay from (b1b) vUl 
lncreah the utility of 0t1it person more than tt wtll deoreaae the utlUty 
of the other persc:n'l. heh person •1 thhllt that he ha• a ftalOftable 
chance of •ucceas tf he tries to get a Uttle btt more than the. amount b, 
That t•• if the curves are convex auoh •• tlwt e.ul"Ye 2, the reapecthe 
bargalntn:g •ldUe of the peraoM may play an tncnaatngly ere important 
role tn detftfllnlna the tolutton. of the eicebaqe •ltuatlon. .~ long •• 
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nothtng 11 known about th• putlcular baqall.\ltll llkt11s of the penou, 
nothtng can bl aat4 about lts effeet on the aolutlota. Therefore we u.._ 
e#luded the po•1l1>Ulty of different bargatntna aklUs. Ia testing the 
hypothe•t• tbel'efore the effects of hargalni1'& aldll• have to " .-lvded. 
ta tluat C48e tlle bypothe•ll la that the polnt O>,b) wtU ·~ the solution. 
It ts ·to be expected howevel' ~hat the devtattou of the aelutlon fl'Olll 
(b,l>) will be treater than th• devtatloa from <c.c). 
r1ul1y t t •1 be argued that tht aol\Jtl01\ pl'opoaed by the hypo-
theata ts not untquelJ detemned by the aainaptloas as ls the N«ah 
aolutton. Glwn the apectal aeatumpUou 'Ulidtr wtcb w coutder laolaled 
e.Uaae, thta objeetlon doe• not •• to be a Hdous crt Uelsm. we 
want to deal With isolated exchange under complete tftfonaatlon. Howv1r 
ve are not prt•rlly concerud with the eolutlcm of the exchange probl• 
ae auch. We are concerned with the effect• on th• JtOlutton tf certal1'l 
elements llhtch have btf1uence oa the solutlcm an changed. We •Y 
develop a set of •xloms 8t\d then show that the so1v.tlon logleally follova 
from the axl08t but VS.th the daqer of deatTUCtlon of th• '1hole thtory 
if the aolutton. ts rejected by experitQMLt. 
Or we may ~top a mre general tet of •xloms. "dch vUl c.-tatltly 
be aatiafled by tlle "luttan. suc:b that the solution. ta not the only 
poestbl• IQlutlon ba..O upon the axl01DI. A n .Je.cucm. ·by expertment •Y 
then c4use *' adaption ln Che aol\ltion rather dwt ln th• axlou. we 
have u•ed the t.aat ll)f'e statlsticelly oriental approach. 
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IV. THE 1'WO PERSON CASlt 
In the prevt:oua ohapter we ha.ve dlscussed a spec:la1 hypotheals about 
the eolutton. of a two person exehange attuatlon r•prefttlted by a 1et s of 
posstble uttUty aalu. The b)'POthesl1 l• expected t.o be tl'Ue lf c•rtaln 
ooncllttons are satlsfled. In thla chap~ w th.all eonatcler 111.0h 
apectflcly the condlttOl'tt. tn partteu1&l' w wUt dt11eua• bow an laolated 
exchs:nge •ltuatlOI\ may be repr•sente<l by a gaMI, We 'tldll derlw a pa70ff 
11atrlx for the 141111 aad dlacuaa t,he l'Ules of the game. 'h'ottt. the pa.yo! f 
•trlx ve may dertva again t:he set s of posath1e utlltty 1atna. 
We will start wlth the particular e#hange s:ttuaUon shown by 
Flpn 4. "11da ftptl'e repreNnt• a 1peolal syanetrtc •xcbalp altuet.ton 
•tch wUl haw a 1,_.tric solution, acc:ordlng to the hypothesis. 
Afterwari• we wUl g...-aU.1e the e~nge altua.tlon by introducing 
,..,_.try ltt the utUlty functi•• -.d Sn the tnltlal polltlons of the 
persona. U. wUl a&tpt the bypoth••l• if necessary until ftftally 1t will 
be 1ble to chtal with au P<>••lble tllO "raon m•eomodtty sttuattons. 
Flnt of all ho.-ver we "-~ to be sun that • deal Ollly vl tb 
•xcbange. sttuaUcms \ideh a• audl. that the northta1t boundary of t.he 
set s la Pareto optimal over lt1 mole range. 1.1.\ts vtll be guarat\t.ed lf 
the coqtruc:ted utility functlona of both per$0Nl are eontlm.u>\Ul and 
•t:dctly 111Creaatft8 ln th• um d.lt'ectlon, uy te the rlgbt. If ~he 
utUity function of o person. ls COJltinuous but not st'tlctly lacreaslng or 
deerea•lnfh lt wlll not be possible to C.O'l\$ttuct a eOl\tract curve Vlth 
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lncnaatng or decreaatng utUttlea for that person. Thla bapUea at leaat 
that the maxt .. poaatble uttllty galn of the person remalna conatant, 
wile the maxtllUll poutble utility gain of the other person changes. 
over thts range therefore the northeast boundary of the set s vlll not be 
Pareto opUmal. 
If the uttllty curve of one person ta decreaalns and of the other 
peraon tncnaalng, then the contract curves wlll be auch that the utility 
for both persona lncrea$es. lf they move ln opposite direction along 
their contract curves. '11tta implies also that the northeast boundary can 
not be PaTeto optimal over its "1ole range. 
If the utlUty function• of both persona are strictly tncreaalng tn 
the .,... direction however; the contract curves will be strictly tncreaa-
lftl abo tn the same direction. At any point on hl• contract curve a 
m:Jveatent of OM per90n along his contract curve llU.St be offaet by a 
movement of the other per90n along ht• contract curve ln oppoatte direc· 
tiotl ta order for e.mange to be poaalble. 1.'hua any t.ncr•ae Sn utUtty 
along tb4t contnct curve of one person wtll 1>e accompanied by a decrease 
in utility of the other person along hla cont:ract cuive. 'I'hl• implies 
Pareto optlaUty. Aa the contract curvo are conUnuoua, the lncrea•e 
and decreaM ln uttUty along lt are contbwoua. Therefore the northeast 
boundary of the set s l• contlnuou• and Pareto optimal. 
B. The Play of the c .. 
We will now constnact a payoff matrix \iilch •Y be considered repre• 
sentable for the e.ch.ange situation of Figure 4. We rtoall that per10ns I 
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and It have the same iadtf ference curvea "deb are orthogonal hyperbolas. 
The ln1 ti al poet ttons of persona t and II are on the aamt 1ndlf f erence 
curve and aymetrlc vlth resp~t to the line k, which has aft anale of 45° 
w1 th the x·axl s. 
Aa a strategy we will deflne &ft)' amount of a coamodlty offered for 
exchange for any othu aiaotmt. F1'01ll the tnftntte number of atrategtea 
po111ble by this deflnltlon, we will only c01\Stder atrategle• \htch 
repreact reasonable chance• of aucceas.. V.lth re.aaouble w _.n atrate• 
gles whleh do not l•d to losses fot: any party. Aa any pai't)' can always 
choose not to trade, this seems to us no sertou re.strtctton. 
So we wlll conaider only atrateglea auch that the new po•ittons of 
the peraons vUl be in the clo11ed region tAtIB of Figure 4. 'tbta atlll 
leaves an lnflnlte 1'9Jtnber of atrat.eglea for both pereona. Apparently we 
have to restrict the possible strateglea still further. We auapect the 
'Sol\lticm to be at least Pareto optimal. Let ua therefore conalder a set 
of atrategtea tiihtcb lead to a Pareto optln1al solution and still a few 
other strategies llhlch do not lead to a Pareto optl11al •olutlOI\ but uy 
he cand1d4tea for some reaaon for a different aolutton. aueh that all the 
ea1enttal strategic poaslbtlttlea .of the game 11ay be considered ae 
represented by the chosen strate&l••· 
ltt Figure 12 we have pruerved the necesaary parta of Ftaun 4. 
Furthermore we have Indicated by number• the posalble atrateglea of a 
penon. For tutance the l\Ulllber 1 ••• that person I or It makes a bid 
auch that, lf the bid l• accepted, he vtll be in poattton 1 after the 
exch.tnae. We have $ho....,, 13 different atratqiea. 
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Figure 12. Thirteen representable strategies 
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tn Figure 13 ve have show the payoff matrix for these stTateat••· 
The payoff matrix ahova only the utlllty gain• of tbe peraons. The flrat 
nmber ln a payoff square is the utility gain of person I and the second 
nUtlber the utUl ty gatn of person It. Empty squares indicate that the 
utility gain• for both persona are zero. Only one square in each row or 
colwtn hes 1'\0n-zero entries. Thta Is due to the fact that for any stra• 
tegy of peraon I there is only one strategy of tt, such that exchaage 
actually can take place. At all the other strategies exchange will not 
take place and the paycff vi 11 be uro for both parties. For our 
particular eX411Ple w have chosen the utllitles such as to preserve the 
situation of Figure 4 as realiattcally as poaaible. We have attrt.buted 
a maximum possible utility gain of 10 to both pal'tl••· 
The uppe.r left diagonal shows the utlllty gatna belonglng to the 
solutions on the contract curve. From the payoff matdx we may again 
con.struct tu sat s of posatble uUllty gain• for both persona. In 
rtsure 14 w have shown tbe payoffs as dots tn the set s of possible 
utlltty galfts. To ftnd the northeast boundal'y we may COt\l\ect these dota 
by atralgbt Un.ea such that no dot la excluded fl'011l the aet s. A more 
exact approximation of the set s we get lf we transform the utUttle1 of 
Fl1ure 4 cllr•ctly to the a.et S of Figure 14. 
We may find the solution for thl 1 particular exchange attuatloft by 
applMl•& formula 6 of page 51. A• the maxlMUl'A potalble utility galn& are 
equal for both per801UI, the po.int• E and N tn the fo1'11Ula wt 11 be the 
.._ artd the solution wl 11 be th• tntersectton .of the Pareto optimal curve 
wt th the Une through (10,10). The solution wUl be the point (4.4). 
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Figure 13. The payoff matrix 
a.a;: 
9,0 
4,3 
I 3,4 
0,9 
9,0 
4,3 
3,4 
o,s 
10 
9 
7 
4 
2 
0 
63 
2 4 7 9 10 
Figure 14. The set S of possible utility gains 
The partl•• will divide thelr po••lble utlllty aatn• ln half. 
The pa)'Off (4,4) vt 11 be the aolutton of a particular t110 perlCft 
non-zero 11n ga119 of wtch the characterlattca are the follovtn.gs No 
preplay co-.mlcatlon h po••lble. 'Ibe only COt9.lftlcatlon between the 
play•r• take• place through the announcing of their atrateatea. Both 
player• are completely lnfor.d about the payoff •trl:x of both peraona. 
Player t 1tarta the playing of the game by atlftOunclng a strategy to 
player It. 'Iben player II announce• a strategy to player t. The , .. 
ta ended If the strategies announced by both players have a correapondtng 
payoff square wlth at leaat one poatttve entry. If thta l• not th• ease, 
player I am\ouncea a strategy for the second time, 111htch encl• the 18118 lf 
lt reaulta, together with the strategy of It, ln a payoff with at least 
one poaltlve entry. If tt.Ot, It a'ftftOUllCea a strategy and so on, until a 
payoff wttb at lea•t one poalttve entry la reached, or until a certain 
amount of time ha• pa••d• vhtcb encl• the a••· If the paJOff has at 
lea•t one po•ltlve etry at the eftd of the game. the actual e111Change 
auggeated by the atratea1••• take• place an.cl the partlea receive the 
payoff. 
To teat the hypotheat• the payoffl would be la 1110ney. The effect of 
dt.ffarnt uttlttlea of 1110MY an.cl of bargaining •kllla would thn be 
excluded by proper raftdoatzatlol\ procedures. 
Aa we have lndlcated already before. coMlderlng the payoff matdx 
of Figure 13. ve see that the upper left diagonal of non-zero squares 
represent• the Pareto opttul curve of the Mt s. Thll lspUea that for 
any pereon any strategy with a number higher than. 6 ll dominated by at 
l••' o• ., ... , • .,. wldl a nuah• l'*U Clum 6. 'l'hl• •a•• st.nmglr 
that both ,_.,. tdU •tidy lf •t anly •~ dhtctea With ......... 
10Wt' thaQ. 6. 
SUppo~ foi' ·lutance Chat "r.,. '.t ~· the atraqgy with 
,...._ 11. 1ba ll at\ ..,..... •Uat•Y 3 -.h tut Ml'llOft ll lftC1."U.IU 
hi• UllUty •l• 1dtb.ovt ,. ..... 1 dMmglftg bi• \ttiltly ..... !be - l• 
tl\18 lf the: ft)J,u .of ,_.,nl 1 _. lI aft ta~. 
A• ._. potnt..S out al1'Md7 ln the pnvtou -,et.-. tbt ..,_._. • 
..._ted by Slepl a1'd rovnkesr _,,.ft the h»ot1'4t1l•t that ~M panlet 
ld11 clt.tde thtt'f utUU.-, gatu la qtf 01\ 0.. Pan\O optl•l .._. la 
thlt ..-1al .,..utc tltua.tlon the aelutlOI\ potai (4,.4) la aJ.• the 
...-t.u:sw •luH•· 
ue wtlt llOV lftldUally lacna• the .a..-.try bl'-- per._ t aN:t 
II tao,._ to be able to dea.1 wt.th •U. pesll.lbl• tw ~ ltol•ted 
·~ 1ttuuou. r :tJ'at of •11 let ua aupp~ th•t th• utlllty of a. 
pobt.t A on the cootract ~ to J'il"ft 4 t,a ti. ... fo'r both Pft'IOMt 
but that tM utlUiy of. the polm I l• tw ti•••• htgh ~ pe.-mm ll •• 
fol' peTaoa t. "l'lrt effeet of thl• dlff~ 0'1\ the at S of poa1tbtt 
uUlltF plftll td.11 M that ·the utlUt1 scat.ma of Pll'*- tl-. •lUpU..S 
by 2. Fll'lft 15 llMNI the r•aultlna •t s .. 
W. 1117 fll'&Cl the eolutlOd for lhl• particular~ atuatlOll 'b1 
uslna fonula 6 of pa&• Sl .- tmhe.-n 1>1 ••Mld1'8 that • ~. 1M 
U'M thro.,.P the poln.t (AtA) cont.,_.• ... Vlth the ll• tldotllb (10,10). 
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Figure 15. The solution in the asymmetric set S 
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A little calculation vill ahow, that the intersection of thla line with 
40 40 
the Pareto optimal curve vtll be the point <7.7>. The line through the 
polnt (A,B) coneapond• vi th the line through the point (10,20). The 
lnteraectton vlth the Pareto optimal curve ta the point (4,8). The aolu· 
tlon will now be the tnteraectlon of the Pareto optimal curve vtth the 
14040 1 3448 Une through the potnt 2<7.7> + 2(4,8) • <7.7>. or about (5,7). Aa 
40 40 the Pareto optimal Cur¥9 between <7.-;> and (4,8) ta a straight line in 
our particular example, the point (~,~) le the solution. We have 
iftdicated the solution by the point H ln Figure 15. 
The hypothesis mey be teated again by the proe-dure of repeated play 
of a &a• of lltltch the pa,off aatrtx la the same as the one shown tn 
Figure 13, except that the efttrtea for person II are multiplied by 2. 
Of course w could have IMlltlplted the utl Hty gains of person II by • 
number greater than 2. Thia may be neceaaary if w want to get algnlfi· 
cant re•ulta with as few experl9eftta as posatble. Further1110re the 
toluttot\ (5, 7) la not a payoff In Figure 13 If the entriea for person tt 
are multiplied by 2. Therefore ve have to adapt the strategies euch that 
at least the payoff (5,7) wlll be a possible aolutlon and such that a 
sufficient number of aolutlona -.ore or l••• cloae to (5,7) are also 
possible. 
There ..... to extat no apeciflc evidence available fro• conducted 
experiment•, vbich 11llght support the hypothesis. Siegel and Fouraker 
(7, p. 61) have conducted experlMenta to teat the effect of aaplratlon 
le'Yllls on the outcome of bilateral monopoly. '11le dlffer....t possible 
maxl11UM utility gain• could Induce different aepiratton levels about 
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poaalble retulta. However their experlllle'ftta are aot comparable with the 
pftH't'lt ut '*Pt becauae, among other thtqa, thty wre oollduct•d Uftder 
tncomplete lnformatton of both parties. 
How 'NOuld th• solution look Uke ln an exchana• d.lagramT In 
FlgUl'e 16 w have shown the tatttal poaltlou of persona t and. II ca the 
same htdlffe<tence C\ll'Ve exactly as tn Figure 4. The only dlfferem:e with 
Figure 4 la that. moving fro111 A to B oa the contract curve peraon t 
tnoreaue his uttUty by 10, but p•rsoa tt by 20. 
The poirit C shOtii'a the compett ttve •olutlon. It is also the aolutton 
if the tnCJ'ease ln uttUty for both pe1'1ona l• the same. as •• the caae 
ta the prevtoue section. But c can not be the soluttot'l if the maximum 
poaaible uttUty galu are dlfterent, according to the hypothesis. At C 
the uUUty aatn. of person l la 4 and the utUity gain of person It ta a. 
ln o'l'd.er to get a cilhtrtbutlon of utllity gataa tidch ta sttll Pareto 
optimal. but with an vtUlty aat.n of S for p•raon I and 7 for peraon 11. 
person t ha• to move along the ccmtract curve tn the dlrecUon 0£ 8 and 
pe't'aon tI tn the dll'eet10t\ of A •uob that exebaftge still remains poaslble. 
The posttlona of peraona I and tt such that the utUtty pin of 
p•rson t ta S and of perBOa IX la 7 • • have iftdlcated by the potata n1 
re1pectlvel7 Rxr. The prlee or exchange ratio at thl• aolutlon ta 
tndlcatea by the slope of the vector (Hll .. ti), ddch la equal to the 
alope of the vector (H1 - t). FUrthedOre Ot11 .. It) + (B1 • I) • o. 
Person Il wUl exchange (bi - a) of commodlty 1 for (d - c) of ccmaodlty 2. 
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Figure 16. The solution in the exchange diagram 
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D. Unequal It\I ttal Poat ttou 
Now •uvpoae we lftel'e•M the ••,..try of the at tuatlon fo1' pel'IOU t 
encl II still •re by aUovtt\8 for different utlUty ltvel• •t the lntttal 
po1ltlon. In Ftgure 17 w have shown the poattlona of per10ns t and tt 
at dUferent hvUfferenc.e curves. The competitive tolutton 11111 be 
coutructed by th• aame •thod •• und ln Metlon c of Cbapt«t u. 
The only difference 11 that the Urte with Panto opth•l po•lttou 
of peraona t and 11 n.ov conelat• of two parts, one pat AB for per10n I 
and one part en for ,.non. tt. We have ahot11t. the aolutton polnta H1 and 
1111 ta the eaae that the uttUty galu a" as tn SMtlcm c. 
Now avppoae the uUUttea b4tlongt1'g to the tnlttal poattlon• a.re 10 
for puaott l and 30 for perJOn It and the aet s ef poaatble utlllty gain• 
ta as ln Ftpre 1S. We then coutnsct a •et s• of possible uUUUe• 
tranafondq the ol"lgln of the Mt s aa la lhown ln Ftgvre 18. 
Out probl1rt1 la nowt Can w extend the hypotheal1 such that lt ls 
appU~ble to the Mt s• al'°t Suppo,. w could. P'lr•t of all w lft 
that tht northeast boutldary of the aet S' 1• not Pareto optl•l ove.- lts 
eiiti re lagth. '11lla would already 111ke the point ! of fol'lll.Jla 6 a 
<loubtfull endpolnt of the J"ll'ftl• of possible eoluttou. 11\e point E for 
lMtaMe wuld be the bttersectton of the lla:e tlnrougb the pol1\t (20t20) 
wltb the nottheaat boundary. In thls CAM the polat lt la the polnt 
(20,20). But the polat (20.30) then could be reached wttbou.t person I 
looslq anythtaa. 
In f4ct person 11 11ight fttl"-1' consider any aoluttcm whlclt would 
yteld ht• a total utlUty of leas t.han 30. Llkevlae peraon t would never 
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Figure 17. The exchange diagram for initial positions of persons I and II 
on different indifference curves 
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Figure 18. The set S of possible utilities of persons I and II 
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consider a solution 11hlch would yield hlm a total uttltty of lea• than 10. 
Because the point (10.30) la the lnltlal uttllt1 of both partlea and 
neither Ot\8 of them 110Uld Ukely agree upon reaching a poattton wor .. than 
bta lnt tlal poll tlon. F\Jrthermore nobody can force el ther peraon to a 
point worae than (10.30). 
There la the.-efore a baaic dlffenn.ce betwe the .. t Sand the 
aet s•. In the .. t s either party cat\ force the other party to the 
point (O,O). In the Ht s• thl• 1• not poaatble. Either party ean force 
the other party at mo1t to the point (l0,30). It l• thl• nalOftlq 1i\lch 
cau .. d Naab (5) to cculder the wont possible situation to wlch either 
party could be forced by the other party a• the orlgln of the Mt S of 
poaatble utility aatna. In thta special case the ortaln of the .. t s 
would be therefore the point (10130). 
Therefore lt la likely that the effect of interpersonal compartacm 
of the utUttle• belonging to the lnlttal 1tatea vtll be less than the 
effect of Interpersonal comparl10n of dtffenncea of maxi.an poaalble 
utlllty gatna. In the flr1t case the partlea can not force each other to 
a situation of equality. but ln the latter ca .. they can. 
Still the tntttal po1ltlona may Influence the solvtton tn the .. t s. 
If the utllltlea of the tnltlal poatttona ~ no effect, the solution 
vlll be the point elf.~> tn s. Thts solution -· found •• the point 
40 40 oec-,..-,-> + (1 - o< )(4,8), vlth ()( . %. 'l'he eff41et of the taterpersonal 
comparllOll of uttltty ,.. expected to be a ~ in the solution from 
(418) tf there •• no tntel"{>eraonal comparison of utlUty, to (~1~), 
lf there vaa lntel'peraonal compartaon of uttUty. 
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The hypothesis ta now that the effect of lnterperaonal compartaon of 
the vtllittea of the tnttlal states will be, that the aolutton moves still 
40 40 f\11."ther tn the dtTectton of <-;•-;>· Or in general, the solution foUftd 
disregarding the utlltties of the lnlttal states, will be adapted ln a 
direction 1110re favorable to the person with lowest utlllty of the tnltlal 
atate. lf the formula 6 of page 51 ts# 
CX! + (1 • o< )N 
wtt may change lt tn: 
o< E + (1 .. 0< )N 7 
tf the dtffel'ence tn utility of the lnltlal posttton ts fa'YOrable to 
pe.raon 11. The dlOH the difference ln utllity of the initial positions 
U in favor of peraon It, the closer D< wlll approach to 1. Th.at ta, the 
solution wf.11 approach an equal dtvlalon of poaatble utlllty gatJUI. 
The hypothesis may be teated agairt by playtng the aame type of a-• 
as auggested tn the previous sectlons. But now at ttwa beginning of the 
game each party ls given an m10unt of JllOftey representing the utlllty 
belonging to bla lnlt1al position. Both pe .. sona will be !nfonred about 
the utlllty of each othera tnttlal poaitlon. 
?be •ff ct on the solution 1n the exchange dtegram of Figure 17 would 
~ that n1 vould move up •till •re along the line OT(I,II} and n11 more 
down along the same U.ne. 
With the adaption of the hypotbeale tn this aectlon, the hypotbesla 
can nov tak care of all poaalble two person two cOll'lllDdlty excbtmge 
•ltwations. Furthermore the hypothesi• can be easily generalized to the 
•commodity case. As the set s remains 2·dlmensiona1, we can atlll 
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derlve a sotutton In tt. But it w111 in gene~a1 not anymore be po11tble 
to derive the aoluttoa in an exchaqe diagram, btcane the dlaar• vUl 
also ,becOM m•dtmen•lonal. 
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V. THE nIREE PERSON CASE 
A. tntrodvctlon 
tn this. chapter ve vtll extend our hYJ>Otheal• to laolated e>11Chan&• 
eituatlona bet-ween three peraoM. '!bl• extension wl 11 lntl'Oduce tw new 
features \lhlch the two peraon case dld ftOt po•M••· We aav in the two 
perto11 case that at any aolutton the exchange ratio betwn c0lm0dit1•• 
waa the same for both peraona. '11lla is due to the fact that at any 
change in the poait1on of one person, the position of the other pereon 
nust c~ by the same amounts. 
In the three person altuatlon thta Med not be the e&M. t11e only 
thing neceaury ta that the total sum of change• b\ position mat add up 
to pro. '11\is lmpllea the poaaiblllty of different exchange ratios for 
the same pair of C01111110dttlea aa w wtll ahov more clurly later on. 
Furthenw>re eshange hl the two peraon case wuld only take place, 
lf all the persona agreed upon the particular aolutlcm.. In the three 
person caae, exchanse •Y take place, if only two of the three peraona 
vtll agree about a particular solution, such that the third peraon ls 
excluded from exchange. 
It will tum out that theae new a•pecta will have influence on the 
fol'IR of the .. t S of poaaible utility gaina. Accordingly we will dlvlde 
the dtacuaston in four parta in order to be able to cllacuaa each different 
feature separetely ln relation to its effect on the Mt s. We will 
diatlngutlh the following aituattonsi 
(1) No unique pdce but agreement between three persorus naceaaary. 
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(2) Untque price and agreement between three p«•ona uceaaa:ry. 
(3) Unique prtce and no agreement between three per80U -nectaaary. 
(4) No unique price and no agreemnt betwen three per80U neceasal'Y• 
With \Sllque price we mean that the exchange ratio betwen two 
coa111oclttles must be the .-e for all peraona. Finally w vlll also 
conalder the competttlve solution and the reatrtcttona on the .. t s 
ftq\llred by 1 t. 
We vlll alwya start by assmlng that the persona haw all the ... 
indifference curvu. The lndtfference curve• are orthogonal h11>9rbotaa 
•• ln the previous chapter. 
Aa the.re are now three persona the set S of poaatble utlllty aatna 
vtll be three dtmenatonal. It wlll have aa boundaries the plane• thro\llh 
the ••• and a aurface connecting these planes tn the poatttw octant. 
For convenience • wtll call thl1 surface alao the northeast boundary of 
the aet s. 
We haw to assure that thla northea•t boundary ta Pareto opttml over 
tta 1i\ole surface. Thia vlll be guaranteed aaatn lf the coutructed 
utility functlona of all persona are continuous and strictly l1'Cl'eaatng 
to the right. Depending upon the particular ccmdlttona under °"'lch 
eachange tatat take place, there are different poaat'ble con.tract curwa or 
poaatbly even contract planes. Howver all theM contract curve• 11a1at 
have lncreaatng values for each perlOl'l .,vtng to the right. Aa any ., •• 
llleftt of one peraon at any point of hla contract curve IU8t be offMt by 
a movtllllftt of one or both of the other persona tn oppoatte dtrectton 
along their contract curve• tn order for UIChanp to be poaalble, an 
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lncruse in utiUty along the contract curve for one peraon must imply a 
decrea•e in utility for at leaat one other peraon. Thia h1pl1ea Pareto 
optimality.. As the contract ~·are c:onttmaoua the decnaM or 
tncruae tn utlUty along it ls contlnuoua. 'ftlerefon the northuat 
boundary of the aet s la contlnuoua and Pareto optt•l over lta mole 
sUl"f aee. 
B. No Unique Price but Aareeaent betwen Three P•raon• Neceeaary 
In Figure 19 va have ah.ow. the po•ttlona of perMna t, II alld tll 
on the aame tndtfference curve. The total amount of c~Stlea 1 and 2 
hA• alwaya to add up to T(t,II,IU)• We auppoae further agatn for 
stmpltclty that the indifference curves of per80l\8 I, II and III are 
exactly the ..- and are orthogonal hyperbola•. 
'11\e curve tn3 of 11axbun possible utility gains of person Ill for 
person• I and II rea.tntna on their lnltlal tndtfferace curves, auch 
that eJC.Change vUl be. possible, may be found as follovaz Let 11 .,ve 
along the tndtffenace curve to perlOn I. 'l'hen III ha• to move clotlft 
along the cune • to t!Mt poln.t P in order for exchaage to be poaaU,le. 
Nov let persona 1 and It twOVe together d01a\ along the tndlffennee cunt. 
Thet III baa to .,,,. alon.g the curve 1113 tn order for exchange to be 
poaalble. If peraona t and II have arrived at Q, 111 vt 11 have arrlwd 
at R, the dtatatlce PR being two ti•• the dlataace fl'O'm I to Q. 
Furthermore, If persona t and II have arrived at the initial poaltlon of 
person III, ttl vtU have arrived at s. III vlll never be able to pt 
more to the Tight, becauae at any point on. tn3, any mo~t of 
79 
2 
T (I ,II ,III) 
s 
0 l 
p 
Figure 19. Construction of the curve of maximum possible utility gains 
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persons t and n toaether w!U keep llI on ttt3 at\d any ntovetlfent of 
person I or ll alone wUl brtng Ill to the left of tu3• 
Now 1t can be ahow that ttt3 l• ldeatt.c.1 with t 3 81\d tt3• Beeauae 
U persons I end IIt Interchange their posltlon, the total amount of 
cosnmodtUu vUl still add up to T(I,tt.III)• Nov we etn ....- the 881111 
procedure vlth the roles of peraou I and III tnt9"11aqed. '!be ..... ta 
tl'\le for the curve 113• 
A• far aa excllanae poaatbUt tlea are concerned, only the regton 
enclosed between the htJUal indifference c.utV• and the curve· 1113 ta of 
intere•t 1 because for points outalde thts reston at least one party vlll 
be worse off than at ht• btltlal po•ltlcm.. ~'bat can we NY abo\lt the 
Pareto optimal posltt0tta wt thin thb regton? 
the highest posalble uttUty for ay person such that the other 
pel"sona nm.tu on their hlltlal lndlfference. curves. ls now lndlcated l>y B. 
B l• the point of t41'\IO.CY of an indifference curve wlth the C\lrft 
tn3 • n 3 • t 3• J.l'UTthel"lllOre B Ues ot\ the atratght Une k from o to 
t(I.tt,tlt)• If person 111 1• at !, pereont t an.c:t II wet be at A, wtch 
Ues also on the straight Uu k. That A 11\USt Ue on the straight Une k, 
lf B Uea on tt, foUows from the addlUcm properties of v.ctors. In 
particular It can be shoe to follow from the fact tba.t the diagonal fl"Oll 
t t.c:> P la cut by the Une k la part• vtth ratio 1 : 2. 
Fr01ft the prcperUea of orthogonal hyperbola• we tmow, that any 
atretgbt Une fl"011l the ortgtn btteraecta the hypetbob.• at point.a wt.th 
parallel tangfittt Unes. We eaU the tar\Pnt Une at A, p al\d at 8 11 q. 
If peraou I and tt move along p, pez"eon Ill -.rat move along q ln order 
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for .-1vrnge to be po1•t'ble. Al p ha.• cmly one point la coi.>n wtth the 
tndtffennce curve t 1 • 111, q ean only have one point la como• with 
1113• q ca not lnterMCt 1113, kcaua• then , ••t htter•ct t 1 • tt1 • 
• Ther•fore at B, q ha• one point Sn COl80n ·tdth Ut) and with 1111 , ao I 
••t be the polnt of taqency. 
ln the 18111 way lt can be sbo'Uft that the atratght Une Al l• the 
aet of Pareto optl•l po•ltlona fol' per&ONI I, 11 at\d Itt. ti\ thla ce.• 
alao therefore the cont:ract curves of perl<n\• t, It a1ld ttt an the. same. 
Thia does not tmply howver, that the poaUlona of per•ou x, 11 ad ltt 
_. ah•YB the .._ on thls COft.tr.-ct curve, a• •haw aeen already. 
In fact then l• Ot\lY oae potnt on the contract curve at '1h1ch cha 
po1ltlou of penot\I l, U and III •n the sea aftd ~h that eshanp 
la poaatble •. 
W. 111y lbow tlll1 ln rtgure 201 wleh hal the ••Mntlal a1pecta of 
rsaun 19, SuppoM pe.-son ttl •vea fl'om » to c alcma the 1tratght llnt 
AB. 1'1len P•l'•n• I an4 II have to •ve togethex balf tlw dist-. ln 
OJ>t>O•lt• dlrectloa. ln ord•r for exchange to be poasl\1•• aay to n. The 
potn.ts C and D art a Pareto optimal C<>iftbtutlon for peraou t, II and lll. 
lut pertic>M l and tl Med not 1llOft together to b. Perton 1 •Y stay at A 
8fUl parSOl\ II 11ay tn0ve an equal di•tance •• Ut but ln crppoatte c!treettoa, 
ta)' to F. 1'hl• ta aptn a eotlblnattort. of Pareto optl•l poattlons. 
In fact any m~t of persona t and t .l along All. 8'lch that the SUM 
of their dlaplacement.a la equal 11' .abaolute value to the dlapbcllllftt of 
peraon ttt, will utiafy tb• condlUon. of Pant• optlmaUty. At the ... 
ti• any mvtmleftt of p•r10u I and 11 not along AB, 1uch that the 8"" of 
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Figure 20. The unique point H on the contract curve 
83 
their dlaplaeoient• ad<ls up to a polnt. on AB, ls •een not to be Panto 
optbnal. Because l t ean ahtaya be replaced by a UIOVtnmtt of both peraona 
al<m.g AB, aw:h that the aum of the dlaplacem11nt1 atid• up to the ..-
point as before but wlth. ·ti. utility of et 1ea1t one perlOl'l lncreaud 4ftd. 
of nobody dec;t"eastd. 
Now suppose peraon Ilt mov•s do'lft\Ward a1ona AB and peraou I art.d U 
move upward together. Then than mat be on.e polnt al.oq AB at 1''1lch the 
poattlona of persona t, It and ttt an the u11e. Furth•rmore there can 
be only one point bec:aue othel'Wlse there would extst two vect<ara auch 
that, if they wen both n.altlplled. by 3, they t(>otb would reault ln the 
ume v.ctor T(t,tt,tn)· Thi• ta lq>o••lble. Ya have ahom th.la unique 
poaltlon of J'et'BOM I, lt aad Ill as the polnt 11 la Fla•• 20. tt 1• the 
lnteraectlon of the dtqottal from t to P vlth the UM k., 
We •• that lf B la the solution polnt of the three person eschaap 
1ttuaUoni1. persons I, It aad 111 wU1 all txchange comodltle• 1 and 2 
for dlffenm.t exchaQge ratloa. '11\e amunt• axc~ed and the •~haup 
rattoa an det•l'l1lned by the vectora (H - Ill)• (ti • It) and (U • t). 
Fm:tbermore (lt • I) + (11 - II) + (ll .. ltI) • o. 
Bow wUl th• At s of poaslble utlUty gains look Ukt tor thh 
pardc.ular exch8W\I• attuatlon? tat ~ 11\lp:PO .. flrat that the maxlllU\l 
poaalb1e utitlty gain of each person at th• point I In figure %0 ta the 
,.., aay 10. The parclc\llar form of tba t10l'theatt bo\11\dary of the set S 
depends upon the uttllty curve• for each P41r80lt belongtag to the contract 
cane An. If the utUltJ curves for all persona are lli\Pr for the 
contract curve, t;hen the northeast bo\B\dat)' o.f tba set s la a plane •• 
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shown in Figure 21. 
In general however the northeast boundary asay have all po11tble fora 
auch that it attll remaina Pareto optl .. l. If the utlltty curve• 
belonging to the contract curve AB are convex for all persona for instance, 
the northeaat boundary wUl also be a convex plane with reapect to the 
origin. 
We wt 11 now extend the hypothesla to deal also wt th the case of thrn 
person exchange, \!here aare.-nt between three persona i• necessary. but 
not necesaarlly at a unique price. Conatdertng the .. t S of Figure 21, 
• ue that any pereon can force a aolutton (o.o,o), tthtch ta analog to 
the attuat.lon tn the two perun case. Llkevlae we uy repeat aimilar 
argument• for the caae of unequal 11axl11UM poa1tble utility gains. 
One could araue that thh three peraoft c.aae la baatcally dlffel'ent 
because of the poaaiblltty of cooperation. However cooperation baa only 
sense if oM party can be excluded tn some wy or another. Thi• 
possibUtty la excluded in tbta aectton. That la, as any peraon haa to 
agree about the aolutton, any person can alw.ya force a aolutlon (o,o.o) 
1f he thlt\ka that the proposed eolutton l• unfair to him. 
In general therefore, tf we call the endpotnta of the Pareto optt .. 1 
northeast boundary of the set s, A, B and C and lf we call the inter· 
aectton of the ltne through (A,A,A) with the Pareto opti11al a\ll'face. E 
and the tnter .. ctlon of the llne through (A,B,C) vttb the Pareto optimal 
surface, "• the tolutlon according to the hypotheala vlll be the inter· 
section of the Pareto optimal surface with the Una through the potnta 
oc ! + (1 • ot )N 0 ~ °' ~ l 8 
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Figure 21. The set S of possible utility gains for linear utility 
curves belonging to the contract curve 
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For purposes af exposition we may agaln take « • % to ftnd .m:lque 
solutions. tn the c ae of Figure 21 the potnt• E and N vtll be the ..-
10 10 10 
and the solution point H can be found as <3•3•3> • 
le generalize the hypothesis to the t1•C0111110dlty case for any post· 
tlou of persons 1. It and Ill on any indifference curve and for any 
strictly lncreaalq utility function of each per.on. '11\e exchange 
diagram wuld becoaie m-dimenaional also, but the set s wuld still be 
3-dlmenat onal. 
To teat the hypotbeaia w ma;, construct a payoff "matrtie fol' the 
game. The payoff "matrt,r for the exdtange situation repreaented by 
Figure 19, wUl now be a cubic with every hor:lcon.tal ellde looking like 
Figure 13. That ts, tJJtY triple with at least on• non•negatlve entry 
will be the only one ot thl• typ• in the sa• horizontal row and colum 
encl ln the ._. vertical colmn. 1h• repreaen.table strategte• should be 
chosen. aueh that po .. tble alternattvei soluttona are in.eluded. 
No preplsy COllll'l.lftlcatlon ta allowed and all players are informed 
ce11pletely about the strategy sets and pa10ffa of everyone. 'l'he pa)'Offa 
will be ln momy and randomtut10rt among proapecttve players would 
.-elude other effects. 
The same vU1 be played a• follow: Person. t announces a •trategy 
to peraona II and 111. 'lben peraon II amouncea a strategy to pereona 
Itt and t and then peraon U I to l and II. 11te gtt1e la ended 1 f the 
strategies announced by all player• have a non-negative pa,_:>f f for at 
least one person and the next r0\11\d of armouncementa is exactly equal to 
the first X'O'Uftd. l'bta lut procedure ls necusary to •lte the poalttona 
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of the peraons a,...tdc wltb. respect to the bldding. 
lf the next rourut of aMouncemen.ts la not exactly equal to the flnt. 
the blddtna eon.tlnuoua. The I•• ts ended 1f th• announced strategtes 
are re.,,.ated once and have a noa-negatlve pa,off for at. least one perSot'l, 
or the. &atle la ended after a definite atllOUnt of time. If agre-t l• 
r•aoh.ed about esehangtr, tt takes place and the parties receive the p.tyoffa. 
Differences b\ utllltlea of the tnlttal poalttou may be taken care 
of l>y giving the player• t.he mo~y PAYo·f f belongift& to the utlUtles of 
the tntttal poalttOJ\S at the begtnntug of the game. &very player agaln 
l• informed about these tut tlal p.a)"Of fa, 
l.et us now tnvestl&ate what happens if lt ta 'tutCeaaary that. th• 
eJ(Cbaqe Tatlo la uaique. Itt. Figure 22 1M have shovn the posltlOM of 
pe-,son• I, 11 ad III on the same Sndlffe~e curve. We ••aume agalu 
tbt all persons ba.e the •• tndUf•rene• CU"8S •tch are orthogonel 
hyperbol••· First of all let u1 COilltruct the cunes of maatnua poaalble 
utUtt7 aatM. 
We can not apply the eame procedure as in the prevloua SRtiot'lt 
beca:Uff that lnvolwa already dtffu-.t pric••· Let u• ftnt eoutruct 
the cu~ of maxi_. possible utlUty &atu for peraot\ I. If peraon Itt 
moves to A on ht• lnltlal lt\dlff•rence f:unt•• person I can mov. to B, U 
person It atays at bis tntt1a1 poslttoa. Furt~re person I can not 
11e>ve tnoTii to the rtpt, beeau•e then either 11 or 111 vould rtaGh a 
poalttoa with an Ut1Uty loss. So B is on t 3• In the same way • Cafl 
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Figure 22 . The curves of maximum possible utility gains for 
persons I, II and III 
l 
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conatruct the whole curve 13 for peraon III .:>vlng along hi• int tlal 
indifference curve and 11 etaytng at hla initial poattlon. 
The curve tu3 •Y be coutructed in the ...._ way. But now not only 
person I .. y llOYe along the ht.dlf f eretlCe curve but tl also• aucb that the 
change in poaitl0ll9 of persona I, It and tit occura alol'll parallel lln••· 
Therefore at the top the curve ttt3 la a bit dtffereat fro• t 3• 
The curve n 3 eonalata of two parta, one for peraon Itt 90v1ftl along 
bta lnltlal hldlfference curve and penon 1 ataytna at hi• tllltlal posi· 
tton and one for per80tt I 11evlna along hla initial tncllfference curve and 
III ataytng at hit initial po1itton. 
By the properties of the orthogonal hyperbola•, the etratght lines 
AB, CD and FG are contract curve• if only the peraon.a t and III, or It and 
III, or I and tt excbanae vlth each other. From the .. contract curve• w 
can f tnd the endpoint• of the northeast boundary of the set s. For 
paaona I tnd III thl1 la at the point B vtth uttllty gain of hY 10. 
For paraon II lt ta at D with uttlity gain of aay 6. In Fiaure 23 ve ha'1e 
tho• theae 81\dpotnts of the aet s. 
In general lt vlll be dlfflcult to ft1'd the exact fora of the Pareto 
optimal northeast boundary of the Mt s. At present w do not know of a 
aeneral •thod to derive curves or plartea of Pareto opUmal poaitlona for 
•ltuattona Uke the one shown. ln Figure 22 and therefore w can mt 
det"lve particular boundarie• of the Mt s. But w kmw that the northeaat 
boundary i• Pareto optimal. For 1lmpllctty therefore we auu. that the 
northeast boundary has the fom ahom in Flaure 23. In any particular 
et tuatton the nortbeaat boundary of the set S •Y be approxt•ted •• 
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Figure 23. The set S of possible utility gains 
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closely aa meeaaaey directly f\"Olft the uttUtlea 'belonsll'll to any 
poaalble solution. In Figure 22 .. 
1he set s ln figure 23 npreMl\ts the 01Change •l twatlon of Fll\lft 22 
fot" the partlcular poalttOl\a of penOM i. It aad tu. But the •t s wUl 
change lf tl:ut positions of the persona ohanp. Of particular lntenat la 
the change ln the set s. if the poattton. of putol\ tt a1ona tlut bdtlal 
lndlffennce C\ll'Ve chaages. Without going tnto ctetatl tt may be ..- that 
the pMr•l 9bape of the tet s, U person It baa the 1a1111t position a• 
pft'aon t, ta as In Figure 14a. Se• for this flgun for ..-pl• •leo 
Figure 27. Oft the other hand Sf the s»•ltlon of perscm tI la .at A tn 
Figure 221 tht general •bape of the Mt S vUl ht a1 ln Figure V.b. 
We now ext.ad the hyPotheal• to laolude alao the genaa1 eau of 
lsolAted ~· 'between thrcte ~r80N with agn..,.t neceaury betwen 
all peraou at a unique price. We •Y use tb4t h11>«>the•l• and the fO'l:mla 
7 of the prevtous aec:t1on. dtnctly for thta ae4tl0l\. The aolutlon 111.11 
•t!11 be different ln. ,_._. .. 1. becawse lt ·can be Ibo• that the ;set S of 
thl• seotloa will alwys be cot\talned ln the Mt s of the previous eectton. 
The polllt• £ aftd N MC••BdY fw the. eolutlon. wt 11 be fouxw moat 
u1Uy by looktng ln Figure 21 for .a utlUty eod>lftlltlon on the Panto 
opt.I.al northeast boundary, \'hlch satt1ftes tilt· parat111t1'lc expreplou 
(6.6,6) and. (10,6.10) for a particular attd fot E aftd N reapectt.wly. 
tn Figure 22 the eolutlon polnt• for each player vl11 be suel\, that 
the 11e>,,_..,,t1 of al.1 pueona from th4tr tntttal poet ti.ans to th.elr poat-
tt.ou at the soluttot\ will be alona par•llel llne• through the tnlttal 
po1ttlou of the penons, 
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Figure 24. a. The set S for equal positions of persons I and II 
b. The set S for II in the middle between persons I and III 
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D. Ufttque Pde. and No A&r••••t betwn three Persona Nece•Nry 
Let u1 contlder the Ntne attuatton •• tn the prevloua uctlon, but 
now we allow exchange to take place at a un.lque price tf •&r•ement bet•en 
two partte• ta reached. SUppoae the lnltlal poattiou alld condttlou are 
•• tn Figure 22. 
We may now dtsttngulsh two po1stble .. t• S dependtq upon whether 
aareement between three parties la reached or betwen two. The aet s of 
poaalble uUlUy satne U agre.-nt la reached between thrff partl••• wtll 
be exactly the set s of Figure 23. On the other hand, the aet S of 
po••lble utility plna tf agreell81\t only between two per.oaa t• reached, 
may be found by consldedng aaaln rtgure 22, 
If aare.-nt 1• reached betwe twt> peraou, then tlut third perMn 19 
excluded fi:oa the e-1tange and hta uttltty satn vUl be uro. Tht.1 lmpUe• 
that the set s can have no potats wt th all coordbuatea post tlw. la other 
word• the set s mu.at conatat only of parts of the plane• through the aua 
of two of the three peraons. The upper bounchari•• la the .. plane• •Y 'be 
eaally found by conaldertag the three poaatble two perlOl\ exobanae 
al tuatlona of Flguq 22. 
Uatng the .... utllltlea •• tn the previous Action., • ... that the 
mulem poattble utUtty gatn for elthel" peraon ln the escbanae altuatton 
bet•• persona t and II, ta 1 at the potnt c, between. pel'IOU 1 an.cl ltt 
l t l • 10 at the pol at B a'ftd. between per.801\1 It and t II 1 t 11 6 at the 
point D. For at111pUclty we aaaume the utlllty funetlona of the pertona to 
be Unear above the contract curve. the rel\lltlq •et s will then be a• 
ln Figure 25. 
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Figure 25 . The set S if agreement is reached between two persons at 
a unique price 
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Suppou the aolutlo\\ point In the aet s of Ftg\11.'e 23 wea H • (3,2,3) 
in the prevt.oua aectton. Suppose tlda point was reached tn the repeat.S 
play of a game. But auppo1e now the YUlea of the .... are chaapd such 
that at the end of the , ... the partte• are allowed to conttmae the 
btddtna aad the a-e wUl be ended alto U Oftly two parties announce 
repeatedly a strategy auch that bet•• them eJ.Chllll• can take plate vi.th 
the exclu•loa of the thtrd party. What vlll hap-pa? 
The point H ln S ta Pareto optimal wltb respect to the utility gal., 
of three partlea. nowver lt ta 1\0t Pareto optimal with t"eapect to the 
utl Uty gah\8 of all poaatble couple• of two paTtle• aa may be ...,. tn 
Figure 25. For this partlcular solution it la not Par•to opthaal with 
respect to the tw perton exchange attuatlon• between persona I end Ill 
and between peraot\a It and III. FUrtherimre person Ul wt 11 be able to 
tncrea1e hl• •xlan poaalble uUUty gatn 1110re by exchaqtaa wt.th 
persol\ t tho by exchanatna with 11, a• •1 be a.- by compartna the 
triangle ABC ad DU'. 
Jut tht1 doea not naturally t111ply that 1>9rson Ill vUl ••h.eft&e with 
per801\ t. Becau" person tt •Y feal' to be excluded vtth the result of 
galn.lng nothtq and may thel"efore offer a more favol'able bld for Ill la 
th• .... 
However perJIOl\ Il wUl not •ke any poa1lbl1 offer. Coutder a&abt 
the altuatlon of Figure 22, 1ilhlch we have •ho• no• In Figure 26, If 
per•o•• t and ttt ••hanae vlth each other wt.th p•rson U having no effect 
on the .aoluttcm, the solution for persona t and 111 wt 11 be the point 
H(I,III)' tf person. ti wnt.• to pnv«n.t this eolutlon be M(I to •k• a 
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Figure 26 . The possibility of person II exchanging with person III 
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btd U.tch vlll change ht• position at least to the left of the potnt A on 
hi• lndtffer9nee curve. The distance frcea II to A betng the ea• a• the 
distance from I to H(I,III)• Becauee only then III vtll 1110ve hl1 poaltton 
to the right of H(t,Ill) and gain more utility. But then 11 vtll reach a 
position worse than h1a lnlt1al poaitton. 'therefore ln tbta case petlOft I 
ha• apparently nothing to fear and the solution will be H(I.ttl) with II 
remaining at his initial poalUon. 
But now suppose that the positlont of persona I and U are the u. 
as ts 1hown in Figure 27. Then the solution would be H(I,ll) and HIII 
say, tf all three persona had to agree abou.t a unique price. But if only 
two peraona could e>eehange, then the two persona could certainly increase 
' both their utility gain by agJ"eetng upon .olutlona H1 and H111 for 
per801la I and Ill for lnatance. With thta pos•iblllty either person I or 
II would not gain anything and III apparently would be in the mo9t 
favorable position. 
If we would construct a payoff matrtx for the persona I and II alone, 
it would turn out that 1t would have similar charactertatlc1 a• the pa,off 
.. trlx of the aa- called "the priaoner'• dll..-a" (3, P• 94). Suppoae 
person III playa no acttve role for the moment. 'l'ben we can ••• that 
there ts a great temptation for both peraona I and 11 to deviate from the 
strategy which results in the solutions R(I,ll) and H111• Becau .. at 
• t 
flrat atght a strategy offering the solutions H1 and HIII or H11 and H111, 
increases th• payoff for peraon I or II. However the other per•on •Y 
retallate with the ultimate effect that the solution reached will be leas 
favorable than the aolutlQI\ at the po•ttlon H(t,II)" 
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Figure 27 . Possible solutions if the positions of persons I and II 
are the same 
Therefore after 801llle tnitlal venture• peraona I and It 11ay decide at 
last that H(l,II) ls the beat solution and stick to the atrategte1 
MCeasary for this 1olutton. As Luce and Ralffa argue, thla solutlOft ta 
likely 1f the play of the , .. la repeated indeflnltely. Howver there 
ls one difference and that 1• the role \lhtch peracm Ill aaay play. 'l1le 
effect of the blda of llt vtll certainly be that the solution point H(t,tl) 
will be attll mo.-e unstable. Ro•ver any altemattve perllOt\ t can offer, 
II can offer as uell becauae of their synaetrlc poaltion1. We auapect 
therefore that the point• n(I,tt) and n111 will ttlll be the solution. 
It •Y be remal"ked that Ill could stlll play a etrategy for the 
. I 
soluttona RI and Ultt by agreeing only to deal wt.th pei-aon I. PerllOft I 
would p<>Hlbly agree with that. ttowver II can alvaya offer exactly the 
same bld as perton I. In that can the rules of the .... can not decide 
between peraona I end II and the aoe la not ended. 
So w have aa the hypothesl• for this caM, that if the poaltlona of 
peraona I and It are at polnt A, the solution vlll be the .... •• in the 
previous aectlon, namely the point• B(t,tt) and H111 , determlned by 
applyina fonula 8 of page 84 to the Ht s of Figure 23. Ot\ tbe other 
haad if the poattlon of II la auch that he can not reasonably threaten the 
position of either player I or III, that ls, if hl• position ta between. B 
a!ld c in Figure 27, then the solution vlll be the point U(t,Ill) vlth II 
r ... lalng at bl• lnttlal poaltlon. The point H(I,III) la determined by 
applying fo1"11Ula 6 of page 51 to the set s of poaalble utility gal•• of 
peraona I and 111. 
tf II move• fro11 A to B along the lndtffennce curw of Flpare 27, 
too 
Ma effect on the solution decreases such that the poaltton of peraon I 
in the eolutlon move• from H(I,tl) to H(I.IIt)• and the position of 
,peraon tl from U(I.tt) to B. 
lf we call the aoluUon point 11' the set s of Figure 23 H 1f the • 
inltlal positions of per~ I and II ere at A .nc.t Hb if the lnltlal 
poattton of person It la at B, then we can UH •• the hypotheal•• that 
the solution vi 11 be the lnteraection of the northeast boundary of the 
set S of Figure 23 wltb the llne through the points 
O (O(.( l 9 
If the tnltlal poaitiona of peraou I and II are at A, o< • 1. If the 
1nltlal poaltlon of peraon II ta betwen B and c, °' • o. 
We •Y apply therefore to thla aolutton the ume conalderaUou of 
lnterper10nal COtDpar1.aon of utility, lf the •xi .. poaalble uttllty 
gatu of uy llI and I are different. However, w ahould take into 
conatderatlon that a change ln the aolutlon •1 chang9 aho the range over 
\fllch the othel' party can threat.en the aolutton. 
For Instance, If In Figure 27 the maxt.111.D 11\Creaae ln ut1 lt ty of III 
l• 20, the solution wlll not an,.re be the point ll(I,tII)• lutead the 
aoluttcm pclnt for pei-aon I will be more upwrd and to the right and for 
Ill ere downwrd and to the left. Thl• lmpllea that the point B, at 
wlch II l• not an.ymre threat.Ung peraon 1, .:>vea domwrd alon& the 
tftdlfference curve. If these factors al:e taken Into con1tderaUon, the 
bypothesle may be applied for any tnltlal poaltlon1, any Increasing 
utlltty curvea and for a-coa.>dltl••· 
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It llllght aeem that thta ca•e 1• all'tl4dy dealt vtth. becauae lf there 
ts no Wllque price. th• there can ohly be agreeMnt betwen two peraona 
and w an baek ltt aection B. But there ta tme difference. tn aectlon B 
• tnveattaated the •ltuatloa •ere. ny pla)1'lr had the power to e•lude 
mfavorable JOluttona. this l• not the case now. 
w may alao aee the dtff•rence 'between thle nctton and the pTevtou. 
aectton •• follow.t. tnatead of comparing the aet s of Ftsure 23 wt.th the 
Mt S of Flgure 25, we now compue the set S of Figure 21, vtth the "' s 
of Figure 25. or w •Y conlpa'l'e the solutlou tn. Figure 22 al\d Ftgura 27, 
with the aolutlON tn Ftauna 20 and 27. 
Suppose the poaltlon• of persons 1, It and UI are aa in Fll\l'l"f! 28. 
Under the uauel lnttlal condltlona, the soluUOA of the prevtoua aee:tlon 
wulcl aUov th• uy that person t 1ll0Ved to A, tt to C and III to !. '111• 
poastblllty of dlfferen.t pdeea now allow alao for a ll0Vea1\t of pereon l 
to JS and o.f II to D 1uch that there la stUl exehaqe poa•tble. Aa thtl 
po1slbllltlea of aecttcm D are lnel~ed ln aect.ton !, thle may taaply that 
the aum of t.he ut1Uty aatn• of all pe.-sou 1• inct•aMd re1at11" to the 
attuatton ta section n. Be.cauM •• the Mt s of Flaur• 21 tnclllde• the 
aet s of Flsur• 23 the •• of the utUltY aalna of the Pante optlaal 
aolutlon. may lncteaM. 
The hypotheats ta now therefore th• ...- as ln the previou• uctton. 
But tnatead of ualq the qt s of Flaure 2.3 w uu now the ••t s ·Of 
:rtgun 21 for our conatderatloaa ad ln pattloula'I' for the appUeattcm of 
f'onmla 9. 
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Figure 28. The effect on the solution if no unique price is necessary 
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r. 'l'he Competitive solution 
Flully l•t u conatdeT the competitive aolutton of the thne penon 
ts conaodtty caM. In rtaure 29 w have shovft the three poaf.tlou of 
peraona I, lt and ttt on the ..- 1ndlffd'efth eUTVe. 1b• curve• t 2, tt2 
aftd 1It2 are the tr•dlng C\ll"'fta of peraou lt 11 and Ill for all relevant 
pnces. 
'ftle compatlttve aol\lt.lon •Y be found by conttruttlq p•rallel ltnea 
through the po•lttot\8 of Pfll'&On• t, II and lll such that the 9Ull of the 
<!haqea in po11ttou add• up to zero. we have show the posltlou ot 
peTaona t, It and III •t the. competlttv• solution b7 c1• Cu and c1u. 
For .my poa1Uou of persou t, It ai\d IlI on any tncllfferenc. 
curvea tn the plane of comntodlUea 1 and 2. the eompetU.tve •lutton .. , 
be fo\l1\d by uatlll t~ ume procedure. Spectal caae• are aaatn the 
situation me" pa<aona I and II ate both at t1- point A, ln slch -•• 
the solution for both wl 11 'be the MM polnt under tba \UJual tpeelal 
colldltiona and the ee .. were perlOft 1I I• at B, in llhhm caH he wtll 
ft.()t take part in the exchange. 
'ftle aet s of poaalb.le \ltUlty plu I• the Mt s of Flaure 23 under 
the same re•trlctlon• for the uti Ut.y functions a1 r•q,dred lrt eection B. 
The compettttw aolutlon. la Pdeto optimal, but • can not flN! lt 
directly ln the aet s. We may find lt ln the Mt s of Flgute 23 by 
taking the ut.lUty gat.u of each peraon belonging to the COllp4ttlttve 
1SOlvt1on ln Figure 29. 
2 
I 
I 
I 
104 
I 
I III 
I 2 
I 
I 
III 
- , ·fr 
- - 2 
0 l 
Figure 29. Construction of the competitive solution 
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VI. SUMMARY 
As a potnt of departure for the tnveatigation of the effect• of 
interpersonal compar1801'l of utt Uty on the aolutlon ln ltolated exchange 
altuattona, tn Chapter II the competitive solution and the Naab solution 
are discussed and a compadton ts •de between theae two proposed aolu· 
ttona. In order for a comparison to be possible, it ts neceaeary to 
a1aume that uttllttea can be measured through a linear utility aaaigftlleftt 
acheme, sattafytna the Von Neumann and Morgenstem axtou of uttUty 
theory. 
It ta found then, that the competttlve solution does not aattafy 
aeveral a1sumpttona neceaaary for the Naab aolutton. In particular it 
does not aattafy the assumptions of independence of irrelevant altema· 
tt vee and aymnetry. Furthel'lllOre l t t • seen that the Mt S of posst ble 
uttUty gains, belonging to any particular laolated exchange attuatlon, 
does not sathfy In general the condttton of convexity required by the 
Nash solution. '11\e compettttve solution does eattafy however the condl• 
tlona of Invariance wt.th reapect to linear uttltty tranaformatlona and 
Pareto optimality. 
In Chapter III firat of all the condittona are stated, under 1Chtch 
Ito lated exchange wtll be lnveattgated. the Isolated exchange ai tuatton 
will be coutdered as a special type of repeated play of a game, wlth 
complete tnfontation of the players. Particular effects of bargaining 
akllla on the aolutton are excluded. It la aeaumd that the utUlUea of 
persona are repreaentable by a ltnear utility aaatgnment ache11e satisfying 
the Von Neumann and Morgenatem utou of \ttiUty theory and such that the 
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uUUtl•• of all persona are euaund with respect to the aame orlgtn and 
are aultlplled by the same constant. 
B•••d \lpOI\ these cofttJtttona. the N.a•h tolutlon l• considered to be 
more Ukel7 than the competitive aolutton in the eau that there la no 
tnterperaonal eomparlson of uttllty and the Sflt S of posalble utlllty gain.a 
la convex. By conalderlng the crt t.lcbu of the Nath aolutlon, then a 
apectal hypothesis for a aolutlon ls proposed for the ca•e that lntft'• 
personal coaaparlaon of utility la poaalble and the aet S of po11lble 
uttUty gains baa a northeast boundary '1hlcb ts Panto optimal. 
The hypothesis ta that, if the endpoint• of the Pareto opU•l curw 
of any let s, belonging to an laolated exchange altu.atton in \hlch the 
utlllttea of the lnltlal amount of coa10dltles are the ..._ for both 
peraon•• are called A and B, and lf the lnteraectlon of the Pareto optimal 
curve wltb the line through the point (A,A) la called E and vlth the ltne 
tht'ougb the point (A,B) ts called N, then the 10lutton wtll be the inter• 
aecuon of the Pareto optl•l curve w1 tb the lbw through the points 
Oc' E + (1 • o< )N 0 ,(IX ~ 1 l 
The exact value of oe ta supposed to be detendud by experl•nt rather than 
by reaaontng. For conventence of expo•ltton howwl" tt ta a•aumed that 
o<. • lj. The hypotheeta la aeen to saUafy only the condltlona of Pareto 
optl111tllty and .,_..try. 
tn Chapter IV the tw person taolated escha1'P altuatlon ts dealt 
vlth tn detaU a• a gam. From the e.chaqe dtaar• a repreaentabl• pa7• 
off matrix la derived with a finite ~r of atrategtea and with the 
utility gain of person t a• the first efttry and the utlllty &atn of 
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per*<m II a$ the .. $CONS entry ln the pa,off s.quaTe \Jelongtng to a partt• 
eulaT patr of atrateglea of persona t and It. Proa the payoff matrix or 
directly from the ••ba1li• diagram the set S of poaatble utlUty galt\8 l• 
cle-rlved. 
The aa- la play.eel aa foltowsi No pr•play coaaunlcatton ta allowed. 
Player t &tart.a the game by announctns a 1trategy to player tt. Next 
player tl announce• a atrategy to player t an4 so Oth 'l'he game ta ended 
tf t.he atrategtea announced by both playe:r• have a cor:respondtng pa)'Off 
•quare wlth at la1t one potttlve entry. Or the game ta ended after a 
certain atlOUl\t. of time baa passed. 
The hypothe•l• ta adapted for the case of untq\lal utllttlea of the 
initial po•ltton.1. The po•ltlont of the persona are 11\dleated b1 a Vector 
ln the •xchange diagrara with coordiNitea the amUrt.ta of ~ltte1 of the 
pU'IOJ\I• The eoluUoa, otermtned by fonula l; will be influenced 
fa"°rably bl the cilreetton of the person with lowest utUlty of the 
initial poatUoa. After thta seneraU&atlon the hypothee.ta l• supposed 
to be appU.cabl• to •Y tw pe~scm ••OOfll'OOd.lty ltolat•d exchange altuatlon 
ln 11htch ·the per80ft8 h4ve utUtt:y functloas, whieb are atrtctly increaahag 
lo. the ,._ dlrecttoa. 
In Chapter V the three persoa taolat.O ft!Ohana• altuatlon l• laveati• 
sated. It ta found that the addition. of oNt perlOI\ add• two "-" eapec:ta 
to the problem, the poaat'btUty of 1llOl'e than one exchange ratio 'betwnn 
tw eomodltl•• and the po•atbtUty of ••~• between only two of the 
thr• p.nona. CoMequcn\tly the eh.apter ts di.'Vicled in four maln MC:tlorut 
depending upon •the asrff!Mnt between all peraou ta required and/or 
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a ml que prt. ce is necteuary. 
Depftdiftl vpoa t.he dUfennt po1•tl>iUtte1, the 3·dtmeut.o'Qa1 1et s 
of poaatble utUtt7 p:lu will also have dlffet'ellt to•1lbh~ foma. If 
Ql'"811tnt betwen three pet90ft8 la ftffffaary but not at a vnlque prlct, 
tt ta argued that tbe ca•• la analog to the two ptnon case dealt wlt.h 
t>efore. COfthquently the hypoth•sl.s ta exttftded to thla oaae atao. The 
only diffe1'ence Is that the polnta (A,A) and (A,B) u•d tn applylna 
fol'llUl• 11 are 11.0w f'Oplat:ed by the polnt• (A.A,A) and (A,B,C) tn \lb.tch 
A, I •nd C are the polnt• of the Pareto opttmd nrf•oe on the ... • 1•, 
and a•ads. 
tf ap-eemeat betVdft three P.•t•o• ta necesaary at a unique pric.e, 
the hypotbe•l• l• the ...., aa before,. but u the northeast boundary of the. 
set s will ta general k dlffer.ent, the toluttcm. vUt be dUfuetlt alao. 
Mon •PftClflt;ally the SUia ot tb.e utUlty ptna of all pel"SOM at the 
to1utton, if a urdque pdq 1• -..cesauy, wUl never exceed the S\n of th• 
utllity galu at the •tuuoa, lf l\O unlque prlce ta necessary. 
If a unique priee ls ne~esaary but not agr..-nt Mtween all ~rsona, 
the aotutton wUl ~ upon the ftlathe po•itlou of the peraona. ?be 
relative poa.ttiona of tbt perlOl'UI dettnthw th• tn.ftuenca each P4!Hem e.a 
1-ve on the solution. lf the lndtff$rence ewws of all person.a are the 
same •net tf the 1nlt1•1 po•ttlou of au persona art Oft the .... lndU· 
ferftee curve, •uch that tbe poatt1oP. ef t-wt> of the t 'b.ne pflrlOnl are the 
s_., then th• •olutlon wUl 'be detefmined by the aa• hypotbe1l1 a• In 
the p•evtoua three person ea••· If the poaltlon of one pe.rlOt\ mvea to 
a PQtnt. on the 1n.1ttal Indifference curve ln the mtddle between the t:wo 
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other peraona, the effeot o.f the per•on oat the aoluttoa will decreaae 
u:n.Ul after a ceJ"t.•ln p<>lflt the person will have :no tffeet on the solu• 
tlcm and the solution foT the other two perlOrlll will be determined by 
applying the hypotheata for the two pex-•oo. ea•• to their attuatson. 
The. potnt 1bere the per80ll will not 1nJ1110ft be able to lftflunce 
the solution will depp.d ·upon the poasSbUtty of the pe~aon to offer .an 
alten.at!ve solutlO'A to the two peraon exclumge attuatton between the 
other two perlOM, 1itllch t.e more favorable to OM of these two penou 
and at the ...- U• cauaea no losa to the person blmself. In general 
thls point will ehange if the uttllty f\11\etlOft.8 of the perlOlUS chaage. 
If nelther a mttque prlae ta nece•ury nor aare1111ent be~wen all 
peraou, the hYPothesla ls anal·os to th• prevtous caatt. The aolutloa 
will tn gene.rat be dlfferet, becauae the relevant Mt s vlU be dtf .. 
ferant. Aa the Ht$ s of the prevlou• caae are 11\Cluded ln the •t• s 
of the preaent ease, the sum of the \ltUlty gains of all pd'soa• Sn the 
pnvloua caM C41\ be at most equal to tti. .- ol the utUU:y ptu of 
the preaen.t case. 
·The hypothe•l • •Y again be, t••ted by playtna a tbne penon a-
wl th almllu charactertatlcs aa the tvo ptt1'90ft pma. Finally a graphic: 
solution of the competttllft three perSO'ft. two comodlty isolated exchanp 
1U:uat.Son la lhown. 
110 
VU. LITERATUIU? ClTED 
1. Reaclerson, J. M. •-' Quandt, R. !. Mlcroeconoattc theory. Mew York, 
New Yol'k, McC:rav-11111 Book CQ8'>.••Y• tnc. 1958. 
2. Hleka, J. R. Value and c.pltal. Oxford, Englll\d, Oxford Usilveralty Pr•••· 1939. 
3. Lue•, It. o. and ltalffa, R. Ca•• and dectalou. Nev York, ..._ Yon, 
John Wtley and sone, Inc. 1951. 
4. Nash, J. F. '11te bargalntng prol>l•• Economet1'lea 181 155-162. 1950. 
'· Nash, J. F. Two puton cooperative ga1111. ECOncaJretl'ica 21t 128-140 .. 
1953. 
6. NellUn, P. 1be tMory of ••bans•· Engl.-ocl CUf fs, Nn J•raey, 
Prenttce-Rall, tnc. 1965. 
1. Steael, s. and Fouraker, t • .E. Jargatntna and group deelstoa •ldQ&. 
Nev York, Nev Yotk, MeCrav-HUl Book C011'1pa1'y, tnc. 1960. 
8. VOft Ne-.inn, J. ad Morgcnatem, O. 'ftMory of 1._I and .conomtc 
behavior. 1"lrat edltlon. Prtnceton, New Jeraey, Prll\Ceton Unlveralty 
Prea1. 1944. 
111 
VIII. ACKNOWLEDCEM!NTS 
The vrlter want• to thank Dr. George Ladd for hla crltici•• and 
advice given during the preparation of the theaia. Furthermore he wanta 
to thank Mrs. Yvonne Beerepoot for the typing of the theaia. 
J 
